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Political humor shows like The Daily Show and the Colbert Report are not only 
very popular, they are also increasingly becoming a legitimate news source for certain 
audiences (particularly young people). The purpose of this study was to compare 
political humor with traditional news. Third-person perception (TPP) was utilized as a 
theoretical framework. The goal of the project was to examine TPP levels for political 
humor compared to news to better gauge how audiences interpreted source and message 
factors.  
Results show two major themes to emerge: message evaluation and social 
identity. In terms of message and source evaluation, there was no significant difference 
in political humor and news. There were no significant interactions for source 
credibility, message quality, perceived bias, and perceived negative impact as 
moderators between condition (political humor or news) and TPP. There was a 
significant interaction for humorousness of message, but only for the political humor 
condition. 
On the contrary, the second major theme – social identification – resulted in 
significant differences between political humor and news. Fan of humor, ideology, and 
social distance were significant moderators of condition on the dependent variable TPP. 
This suggests that social identification plays a significant part in the processing of 
political humor content compared to news content. Implications of the results of the 






“Stop, stop, stop, stop hurting America.”  
-- Jon Stewart on CNN’s Crossfire, 
October 2004  
 
Weeks before the 2004 General Election, The Daily Show host Jon Stewart 
made an unusually somber appearance on CNN’s Crossfire. Under the auspices of 
promoting his book, America: A Citizen’s Guide to Democracy Inaction, Stewart took 
the opportunity to pointedly ask the two hosts (Paul Begala and Tucker Carlson) why 
they were not living up to their responsibility to aid in civic and political discourse. 
Stewart says to both hosts: “You know, the interesting thing I have is, you have a 
responsibility to the public discourse, and you fail miserably” (CNN, 2004, October 15). 
Stewart, who rarely broke from the levity of The Daily Show’s satirical format, was 
making a strong critique of the media’s role in society.  
Fast forward to 2011, critical commentary from Stewart and other political 
humorists is commonplace. Not only does Stewart berating financial talk show host Jim 
Cramer draw in huge ratings, it now makes news (Kurtz, 2009). Despite being staples of 
popular culture, the importance and influence of The Daily Show with Stewart and The 
Colbert Report with Stephen Colbert should not be underestimated.  
Nor should the genre as a whole go discounted and unnoticed by political 
communication researchers. Jones (2007) questions the notion that fake news (e.g., The 
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Colbert Report and The Daily Show) is actually leading to greater political 
disengagement and a lack of political news consumption. He argues that by illuminating 
and questioning politician’s spin and posturing (through satire), The Daily Show 
“informs its viewers in ways that mainstream journalism rarely does” (Jones, 2007, p. 
130). Baym (2005) argues entertainment media, like The Daily Show, is not subservient 
to more traditional political news sources. Quite differently, Jon Stewart manages to 
weave entertainment and political news from a critical perspective, Baym argues, which 
is important to a deliberative political discourse process. 
This project, at its core, explores the very real consequences of fake news. Are 
Stewart and Colbert considered to be legitimate sources? Do people find them 
threatening? How do the hosts inspire social identification? Do they have a high level of 
presumed influence given their celebrity status? 
 Much as political advertising and political news is subjected to media effects 
inquiries, this project examines political humor by the same measures. Thus, the impact 
of political comedy and satire will be examined by looking at source, message effects, 
and receiver variables. This proves to be an interesting exploration – inspiring a number 
of useful questions. Are media messages from comedic sources processed differently 
than messages from more traditional political sources? How much does source 
evaluation impact overall message reception? Are comedic messages mere entertaining 
fluff or are they a capable mode for the dissemination of political information? 
Some argue television harms political participation (Hart, 1999; Putnam, 1995), 
but much of the research on political comedy shows is ambivalent about the genre’s 
influence on viewers and the political climate. This study is an empirical examination of 
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the impact of political comedy shows on the ability to inspire in-group identification, 
and influence attitudes about the media and subsequent behaviors. Only a limited 
number of studies have examined the intersection of political humor and media 
influence (LaMarre, Landreville, & Beam, 2009; Nabi, Moyer-Guse, & Byrne, 2007).  
Theoretical Framework 
 This enquiry employs a theoretical framework of third-person perception (TPP). 
TPP suggests people perceive media to influence others more than themselves 
(Davison, 1983). Third person research attempts to explain how the media influence our 
perception of others and how these perceptions affect the self. Stewart and Colbert, 
while toiling in a rather traditional world of politics, are quite distinct in their influence 
and bases of power. They are celebrities and pop culture fixtures, almost singularly 
propelled by their charisma. More traditional measures of political influence (vote 
choice, elections, or policy changes) do not accurately get at the persuasive power of 
celebrity. By using a TPP framework, a goal of this project is to better understand pop 
culture influence on the self and our perceptions of its influence on others. 
These perceptions, important in and of themselves, can also influence an 
individual’s behavior. For example, an individual may enjoy Jon Stewart’s irony, but be 
concerned other people will not understand the deeper meaning. This concern may 
inspire them to post a clip and explanation on their Facebook page. Between 
understanding perceptions and understanding how these perceptions affect behavior, 
behavior is the lesser known of this equation.  
Political humor and entertainment media have limitedly been looked at in terms 
of message processing and subsequent impacts on attitudes and behaviors. It is arguably 
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a recent phenomenon that the lines between traditional news and entertainment have 
become so blurred in terms of credibility and legitimacy (Bennett, 2007; Peterson, 
2008). This study will examine source legitimacy, message seriousness, and presumed 
influence of humor mediated political content.  
Research Overview 
In summary, this research includes three goals: to better define the way in which 
identity is employed in the humor of the two shows, apply the theory of TPP to political 
humor, and to further develop our understanding of the theory. 
Even though there is much discussion about the impact of political humor on 
viewer attitudes, and subsequently America’s participatory democracy, the evaluations 
of these mediated messages from a social influence perspective are limited. Much of 
humor research has focused on sender and receiver differences. An interesting subfield 
of humor is message production and message reception. For instance, politicians are 
attempting to be more humorous and approachable (Schutz, 1995; Hollander, 1996), but 
how does this impact their level of credibility? We need a clearer understanding of how 
humor functions to lower our defenses, lessen message rejection, or manipulate our 
evaluations of source. 
 This project will first provide context for the study. Political humor is an 
important and popular topic for academic research, and chapter two will provide a 
review of the important findings. Chapter three will review humor from a psychological 
processing perspective. In particular, the chapter will explore how The Daily Show and 
The Colbert Report use affiliative humor to mark in-group/out-group humor 
distinctions. Chapter four provides the theoretical framework for the study. TPP will be 
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used to examine how comedic sources are interpreted by individuals, what impact they 
are perceived to have on society, and what behaviors they may inspire. Chapter five 











































In recent years, political humor has become an essential component of modern 
American political culture. Whether hosting a “Rally to Restore Sanity” or running a 
political ad through the Colbert Super PAC, political humorists have emerged as a 
legitimate and influential political force. Jon Stewart was even called “a necessary 
branch of government” by respected NBC news anchor Brian Williams (Smith, 2010).  
Modern political humorists are certainly not singular in their influence on 
popular culture – they follow in the tradition of humorous political commentators like 
Mark Twain and Will Rogers. Nimmo and Combs (1992) call this “bardic punditry” in 
which humorous and populist commentators “speak of and even with elites, but they 
certainly do not speak for them; they are more likely to speak ill about them.” (p. 50) 
Both the news media and the academic community have hailed the rise in stature 
of political humorists like Stewart and Colbert. Stewart has been on the cover of the 
January 5, 2004 issue Newsweek and Colbert served as the magazine’s guest editor for 
the June 6, 2009 issue. A Pew Research Center poll (2008, May 8) found Stewart was 
the fourth most admired journalist in the country and both The Daily Show and the 
Colbert Report are viewed as often (by 16% of Americans) as primetime cable news 
shows. 
As social phenomena, political humorists are important influences on the 
political and media environment. Herbst (2003) suggests journalist and media figures 
can be positioned into a level of pseudo political authority by virtue of their place in the 
focal point of American media consumption. She argues media figures, even those in 
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entertainment, “can achieve media-derived authority” and “[p]undits and columnists are 
often propelled into legitimate public roles, via the apertures provided by their news 
organizations” (Herbst, 2003, p. 496). 
Given the rise in popularity and stature of hosts like Stewart and Colbert, the 
prolific amount of recent research on the genre is not surprising. Political humor shows 
have been studied in the contexts of political knowledge (Baum 2002; Prior 2005), 
political participation (Pasek, Kenski, Romer, & Jamieson, 2006), media impact 
(Holbert, Kwak, & Shah, 2003), cultural relevance (Baym, 2007), and impact on youth 
voting (Hollander, 2005). 
Political humor and entertainment media are staples in America’s political 
culture. Much of the research on the genre covers two main areas: the increase of pop 
culture’s influence on American politics and how the political humor genre compares 
with more traditional news. This section will first provide an overview of the modern 
incarnation of the political humor genre, including The Daily Show, Colbert Report, and 
Real Time with Bill Maher. The impact of political humor on popular and political 
culture will also be discussed. The chapter will then review relevant research on 
political humor. 
Genre Overview 
There are three primary shows that constitute the “fake news” segment of the 
political humor genre: The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, the Colbert Report, and Real 
Time with Bill Maher. Each of these shows focuses on political news, political 
discourse, and media criticism. Moreover, the hosts of these shows regularly engage in 
political culture outside the confines of their shows. Texts of these shows (primarily 
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video clips) often appear on more traditional news and are circulated through online and 
social media. For example, MSNBC’s Chris Matthews often includes political humor 
clips on his show to highlight how politics is playing in popular culture.   
Other important shows in the political humor genre include NBC’s classic 
sketch comedy show Saturday Night Live, which maintains a strong tradition of 
political satire. The show’s “Weekend Update” segment is actually an early example of 
fake news. Political humor also appears in other forms in entertainment media. Late 
night talk shows (including the Late Show with David Letterman, the Tonight Show with 
Jay Leno, Late Night with Jimmy Fallon, and Jimmy Kimmel Live) include elements of 
political satire, primarily in the form of comedic monologues. Biting political satire has 
also surfaced in shows like Comedy Central’s South Park. 
The Daily Show with Jon Stewart airs Monday through Thursday at 11 p.m. EST 
on Comedy Central. The Colbert Report with Stephen Colbert airs immediately 
following The Daily Show. While not the only shows on television to utilize political 
satire, Stewart and Colbert are perhaps the most popular.  
The running theme of The Daily Show is “faux” news usurping “real” news. 
Stewart uses a behind-the-desk nightly news style for his show, which allows him to at 
once mimic and mock the news media. He presents his version of the day’s news 
including montages, shoulder graphics, and sound bites from newsmakers.  
While the show is generally focused on political issues of the day, the crux of 
the humor comes from Stewart deconstructing the news media’s framing of the day’s 
stories. The first half of the program is a snarky reflection of recent political news 
coverage. Though politicians are cannon fodder for Stewart’s jokes, the media itself is 
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more often than not the real focus of his ire. For Stewart, the media often fail to 
adequately cut through political rhetoric and spin. Much of the shows content thus tends 
to be more critical, examining not only an event but also the media’s take on the event. 
Even though Colbert is a former contributor to The Daily Show, the Colbert 
Report takes a rather different approach. Colbert adopts the posturing of a demagogue, 
obsessed with his status and power within politics and popular culture. He mimics the 
bluster of political talking heads, often spouting rancorous and vitriolic rhetoric. 
Colbert’s social commentary is often subtle and inferred – there is an unspoken 
assumption the audience will understand he is being hyperbolic and purposefully over 
the top. At other times, his intentions are clearer – as in the often-used segment “The 
Word” in which text cues let the audience in on the joke. Peterson (2008) eloquently 
sums up the Colbert experience as thus:  
Colbert is less concerned with telling the truth than with examining how our 
ideas of truth are used to manipulate us. His subject is not some abstract, capital-
T Truth but truthiness – the slippery, manipulative ground of contemporary 
discourse that cannot be navigated on the two-dimensional axes of “true” and 
“untrue” (p. 144). 
 Real Time with Bill Maher airs seasonally on HBO. The format of the show 
includes satirical monologues, political roundtable discussion, and sketch comedy. Like 
Stewart and Colbert, Maher uses satire as political commentary, though his show tends 
to be less focused on media criticism. Maher’s show differs from Stewart and Colbert 
by including an extended segment on political discussion. Set up as a political 
roundtable, Maher veers away from satire to include a greater emphasis on political 
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discourse. While Real Time airs on the premium channel HBO, it still remains rather 
popular. Clips of the show are often shown on more traditional news channels and often 
Maher appears as a political commentator on MSNBC.  
Impact on Political Culture 
As political humor shows grow in popularity, the genre’s integration into 
political culture and political discourse also continues to grow. This can be seen in the 
impact of show content, the rise in the influence of political humor hosts, and in the use 
of the genre as an essential political publicity platform.  
Political humor shows have become particularly relevant during political 
campaigns (Babcock & Whitehouse, 2005; Payne, Hanlon, & Twomey, 2007). These 
shows tend to cover presidential campaign events while simultaneously deconstructing 
the manufactured spin and framing provided by the politicians and the media. This two 
-sided, in depth approach may actually provide a more well-rounded understanding of 
the political event (Jones, 2007). This is arguably true for non-campaign political 
struggles that take place between Congress and the White House as well. 
 Campaigns are purpose-built to create and foster the image of a candidate, but 
political humor shows are keen on manipulating this image. For example, this was 
particularly the case in 2008 when Saturday Night Live reworked the image of Sarah 
Palin through the satirical portrayal by Tina Fey. Palin had a difficult time escaping the 
constructed satirical image. In the 2010 midterm elections, Delaware Republican senate 
candidate Christine O’Donnell was derailed when Bill Maher repeatedly showed 
unflattering interview footage. O’Donnell’s claims to an interest in the occult were 
circulated through traditional news and became a popular culture phenomenon (so much 
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so that O’Donnell released an ad in response to the Maher clip) (2010, September 28).  
These are just two examples of the content of political humor shows having a more far-
reaching impact than just on their immediate audiences. 
 Political humor hosts are also becoming more influential for their contributions 
to political discourse and the political process. In 2004, Jon Stewart publicly scolded the 
traditional news media on CNN Crossfire (Jurkowitz, 2009). Five years later, Stewart 
again broke from his “funny man” image to berate CNBC’s Jim Cramer for his 
contribution to the financial crisis (Jurkowitz, 2009). In 2010, frustrated with the 
common man’s lack of a political voice and in response to conservative Tea Party 
political rallies, Stewart hosted the “Rally to Restore Sanity” on the Washington Mall 
(Smith, 2010). 
 Stephen Colbert has also become influential in the political process, but in a 
much different way. Instead of lashing out at the ridiculousness of the political process, 
Colbert joined the political process in the form his political action committee (PAC). 
The Colbert Super PAC, which promotes “a better tomorrow tomorrow,” plays on 
Cobert’s demagogue image. Colbert uses the PAC to highlight America’s broken 
political system by buying influence in political campaigns.  
Political humor is also influential as a publicity platform for politicians and 
world leaders. A sophisticated politician understands and utilizes these venues in order 
to reach different audiences than they may find with traditional news (Baum, 2005; 
Jones, 2005; Van Zoonen, 2005). For instance, The Daily Show and the Colbert Report 
have appeal and popularity with younger viewers (Hollihan, 2009). As such, political 
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humor often hosts a superstar line-up of politicians, world leaders, and intellectual 
thinkers. 
Going on political humor shows and talk shows affords public officials the 
opportunity to be funny, clever and likeable without really having to talk about issues 
(though both Stewart and Colbert will often ask questions in an attempt to hold 
politicians accountable for their views and actions)  (Schutz, 1995; Hollander, 2005). 
Political humor shows and talk shows offer what traditional news cannot – a chance to 
connect with an audience through humor and personality (Baym, 2007). The more 
relaxed atmosphere allows candidates and politicians to let loose and show more of 
their personality and private sides (Just, Crigler, Alger, Cook, Kern & West, 1996; 
Baum, 2005). Bippus (2007), in an examination of the use of humor in political debates, 
found politicians with good comic timing and self-deprecating styles of humor are the 
most effective in wooing voters. In 2008, both Barack Obama and John McCain made 
multiple appearances on The Daily Show, The Colbert Report, and Real Time with Bill 
Maher. 
Political Humor Research 
Much of the research on the genre focuses on “fake” news (comedy) versus 
“real” news (traditional news). A perusal of political information available every 
evening in America blurs the lines between journalism and entertainment (Peterson, 
2008). No longer do people learn about politics simply through the evening news – late 
night monologues and political comedy shows offer their often more approachable 
versions of the day’s news (Baum & Jamison, 2006).  
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Delli Carpini and Williams (2001) argue entertainment programs may have a 
greater impact than traditional news as strict definitions of where one can find news 
become blurred. People use late night talk shows to filter and decipher news 
information. Bennett (2007) argues:  
As more Americans gain perspective from late-night comedy such as The 
Tonight Show with Jay Leno and the Daily Show with Jon Stewart, there may be 
reason to think that the news is losing its capacity to focus public attention on 
the aspects of issues that may be most important. Yet audiences who suspect that 
news is hardly a natural window on reality, because it is heavily constructed by 
politicians and journalists, may look to entertainment for help in deconstructing 
it (p. 12). 
A rather diverse set of people supplement traditional news consumption with 
late-night comedy shows (Young & Tisinger, 2006). Many Americans gather news 
about politics and foreign policy from venues like late-night talk shows (Baum, 2003). 
Feldman and Young (2008) argue that exposure to political information via late-night 
comedy shows is correlated with an increase in information seeking from more 
traditional news sources. Moreover, Landreville and colleagues (2010), in an analysis of 
2004 election data, found watching late-night comedy shows increased the likelihood 
that young viewers would watch political debates and talk about politics.    
In a study of late-night comedy shows, Young (2004) found content tends to be 
repetitive about the subjects they joke about, building on their audiences’ existing 
knowledge structure. Among those with lower political knowledge, late-night viewing 
increased the salience of candidate caricatures (Young, 2006). Late-night comedy 
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shows focus on candidate traits which may not have a huge effect on voter behavior, but 
do influence evaluations of candidates (Moy, Xenos, & Hess, 2005). 
Political entertainment shows draw a different type of consumer seeking out a 
particular presentation of political information. They often present a more approachable 
take on the political news of the day, especially for people less inclined to consume 
political information (Baum & Jamison, 2006). Some argue even though attending to 
entertainment media is considered a diversion from reality, entertainment media can 
contribute to overall perceptions of the government (Pfau, Moy, & Szabo, 2001) and 
non-traditional news media can be used in conjunction with more traditional news 
media to influence confidence in social institutions (Moy, Pfau, & Kahlor, 1999). 
Political entertainment shows also tend to attract viewers who are decidedly less 
partisan; partisan people tend to consume rather partisan media (Hollander, 2008). 
Young (2008) argues humor can also reduce persuasive argument scrutiny. Not 
surprisingly, then, viewers acquire less issue information using entertainment sources 
(Kim et al., 2008). Hollander (2005) argues “late-night television viewing increases 
what young people think they know about a political campaign but provides at best 
modest improvements to actual recall of events associated with the campaign”(p. 411). 
Entertainment shows trigger different information processing compared to 
processing of news (Kim & Vishak, 2008). Entertainment viewers rely upon overall 
impressions (especially impression formations of the political actors) while news 
viewers recall factual information while processing political information. Entertainment 
shows predominately produce changes in the way people feel about politicians rather 
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than how they cognitively consider politicians and issues (Pfau, Houston, & Semmler, 
2007). 
In some cases, in comparison to political humor, news remains a stronger 
predictor of issue salience (Holbert et al., 2003). Though, Holbert and colleagues (2005) 
argue the impact of political humor is often overlooked as an important source of media 
framing which influences audience understanding of political issues. Indeed, political 
humor shows tend to deconstruct the prescribed frame of an issue and event, and 
reinvent the story with a new satirical frame (Jones, 2007). Entertainment media can 
even be more effective in framing perceptions of reality in the context of government 
policies and international issues (Graber, 2009). 
While comedy and entertainment programs may be approachable forms of news 
consumption, Bennett (2007) argues the actual content is still drawn from mainstream 
news and the more banal news items can still only be found in the news media. Relying 
on entertainment media for news may restrict the consumer to the most sensationalistic 
and dramatic of news stories. Moreover, political humor shows mimic the news, but do 
not abide by the same socially constructed journalistic code (Borden & Tew, 2007).   
Arguably, political humor shows present political information in a way that is 
entertaining and engaging. Indeed, young voters do tend to gravitate to entertainment 
shows like The Daily Show for political information (Hollander, 2005). Research is 
mixed on the impacts these fun-to-watch shows have on political knowledge and 
political participation. Political humor shows have been shown to have a greater effect 
on people with less political knowledge compared to those with high political 
knowledge (Baum, 2005) and may increase political knowledge in younger viewers 
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(Cao, 2008). Late-night comedy shows tend to lead to greater knowledge of more 
simple political facts for those who are not political engaged (Baek & Wojcieszak, 
2009). Of course, political humor shows are not capable or inclined to cover the breadth 
of topics a more traditional news source like CNN would cover (Jones, 2007). 
In terms of political knowledge and political involvement, there appears to be a 
distinction between what is perceived as news versus what is perceived as 
entertainment. Prior (2005) found those who consume more entertainment media had 
lower political knowledge and lower political turnout than those who consumed more 
news media. Soft news, with its entertainment factors, is a genre that may catch the 
attention of viewers who would otherwise avoid hard news on subjects like war and 
politics (Baum, 2002; Prior, 2003). Political humor can arguably be considered a form 
of entertainment television, but it is unclear if political humor viewers present these 
knowledge and engagement characteristics. 
The structure of political comedy shows may also affect levels of political 
engagement. The shows tend to use thematic as opposed to episodic framing of political 
issues and a majority of the jokes are negative toward the target (Nitz, Cypher, Reichert, 
& Mueller, 2003). Moreover, content tends to focus on personal characteristics instead 
of issues (Nitz et al., 2003; Niven, Lichter & Amundson, 2003). Late-night talk shows, 
which gather joke content from politics and the news, tend to be more negative than 
traditional news about politics and government (Moy & Pfau, 2000). However, in a 
study by Moy and Pfau (2000), this negativity only had indirect effects on the further 
evaluations of the president and congress, and actually had positive effects on 
evaluations of traditional media.  
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Given that political comedy shows and late night talk shows tend to focus on 
personalities (in lieu of presenting issue information), this may be leading to a decrease 
in civic engagement (Pasek et al., 2006). Still other research has found when young 
people consume entertainment media and news, they are more likely to engage in civic 
activities and have increased salience of political issues (Hollander, 2005). 
Summary 
 Based on the current research on political humor shows, especially The Daily 
Show and The Colbert Report, it is apparent that this non-traditional venue for political 
news and discourse is important in American culture. This seems particularly the case 
for younger people who are not as bound to traditional notions of relevant and credible 
sources of political information. Indeed, for the relatively politically unengaged, 
political humor shows provide an important information function. And political players 
and the news media are starting to take note.   
 To date, much of the research on the political and social implications of The 
Daily Show and The Colbert Report is done as a comparison to the current news media 
culture. This project will build upon this comparison by examining differences in news 
and political humor in terms of influencing attitudes and behaviors. This project will 
next explore the type of humor employed by Stewart and Colbert and how they 







Psychology of Humor 
Humor is at the heart of the American political system. Dudden (1985) argues in 
American political humor, the “components of alienated and self-detached humor were 
always present. These included the skeptical, the sardonic, the mocking, even the 
deliberately cruel. … Its political effects were anarchistic, its style tough and enduring” 
(p. 9) 
Approaching the topic of humor is surprisingly difficult. For starters, what is 
perceived as funny to one person may be completely irrelevant to another. Why do 
some people prefer slapstick to satire, Will Ferrell to Jon Stewart? Moreover, is it also 
possible to find something funny one day (and in one frame of mind) and not funny the 
next. And why do some people get a joke and others do not get the punchline or play on 
words? 
In politics, people from different ideological perspectives have been shown to 
respond differently to humor. Wilson (1990) examined the relationship between 
ideology and perceptions of humor. He argues conservatives prefer resolution of 
incongruities more than liberals. Moreover, conservatives tend to dislike humor that is 
aggressive and anti-social. 
This complexity is illustrated by a recent study of The Colbert Report which 
found when people were processing the show’s content, they tended to decode the 
political information according to their ideological beliefs (LaMarre et al., 2009). 
Conservative viewers believe Colbert is only just pretending to use satire, and really 
holds the right-wing attitudes he espouses on the show. Liberals, on the other hand, 
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believe Colbert deftly uses deadpan humor and satire as commentary on conservative 
viewpoints. Satire is often misunderstood due to ignorance, bias, or an unwillingness to 
understand the true meaning of a message (Gruner, 1978; LaFollette & Shanks, 1993). 
Baumgartner and Morris (2008) found Colbert’s posturing as a conservative 
ideologue resulted in young viewers having more positive evaluations of Republican 
politicians and their policies. Both these studies show just how difficult pinning down 
the concept of humor is when examining it in a mediated framework. Depending on 
group identification, Colbert may be interpreted quite differently by different people. 
In addition to understanding the rise in popularity and influence of Stewart and 
Colbert, it is important to understand how their distinct forms of humor are categorized. 
This chapter will provide an overview of the psychology of humor and situate the 
humor styles of Stewart and Colbert within that research. It is argued The Daily Show 
and Colbert Report use an affiliative/disparagement form of humor.  
Humor research informs this project on the social implications of why Stewart 
and Colbert are seen as funny by some and not funny by others; this has implications on 
our own perceptions of the comedians and how we perceived others will be influenced 
by the shows. This chapter will provide context for employing the theoretical construct 
of TPP in chapter four.  
Defining Humor 
Humor has been classified into three areas: social interaction and “spontaneous 
conversational humor”, unintentional humor, and intentional or joke humor (Martin, 
2007, p. 11). Theoretical research in humor falls into three major areas: 
cognitive/incongruity theory, physiological/relief theory, and superiority/disparagement 
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theory (Martin, 2007). Given this diversity, it is not surprising humor has been a 
popular subject of research in many areas, including cultural anthropology (Apte, 1985), 
social interaction (Martin, Puhlik-Doris, Larsen, Gray & Weir, 2003), social influence 
(Nabi et al., 2007), and intercultural communication (Miczo & Welter, 2006). 
Cognitive 
Apte (1985) suggests humor is a sequential process that consists of stimuli, 
cognitive processing of stimuli, and a response to the stimuli (like a smile). Cognitive 
approaches (e.g., incongruity theory) to humor have been limited (Uekermann, Daurn, 
& Channon, 2007). There is still much that is not understood about the cognitive 
processing of humor and how it relates to different aspects of humor research. Perhaps 
this is because a purely cognitive processing approach to humor is limiting. The 
problem with this approach is humor is not merely a function of the emotion mirth (in 
fact it may not be associated with positive emotion at all) nor is it a simple cognitive 
function. One of the initial and most widely studied cognitive approaches to humor 
utilized incongruity theory. Maase and colleagues (1984) argue, “[c]ognitively oriented 
theories view humor as a result of cognitions that are perceived to be incongruous. The 
incongruity creates a cognitive imbalance; the presentation of the incongruity is 
surprising or unexpected, and the imbalance is rapidly resolved” (p. 81). 
Suls (1983) created a “two-step model for the appreciation of jokes and 
cartoons” (p. 42). His study used comics that either contained or did not contain an 
incongruous element; if incongruity is detected, it is considered funny. Suls (1983) 
suggested humor works by discovering the intended outcome of the message. If humor 
is predicted by the receiver, no humor is created. If the receiver does not predict the 
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message intention, they encounter a surprise in which they must negotiate. The receiver 
then looks for the appropriate rule. If the rule is discovered, the receiver understands the 
message to be humorous. If the rule is not discovered, the receiver does not understand 
the message to be humorous. Essentially, the model explains the act of either getting a 
joke or not getting a joke.  
Satire contains incongruous elements. Both Stewart and Colbert use non-verbals 
and text-based cues to create an incongruity between what they are saying and what 
they are really intending to say. Stewart often uses extreme facial gesture and pop-up 
text boxes with a play on words. For instance, the textual title “mess-o’potamia” was 
used when he talked about the Iraq war. Colbert uses a segment called “The Word” in 
which his nonsensical banter is punctuated by incongruous text.  
The model of incongruity theory has some drawbacks. As a definition, it is a 
limited description of a humor process and does not distinguish between the types of 
humor. Moreover, the theory does not consider the emotional state at the time the 
incongruity happened – just because something is incongruous, does not mean it is 
funny. Uekermann and colleagues (2007) argue incongruity research remains 
inconclusive. An incongruity and resolution humorous scenario relies on many 
assumptions which may or may not exist. First, an incongruity must be detected; even if 
an incongruity exists, the receiver needs the ability to recognize how the humorous 
message or incident is different from the usual. In a two-step process, the statement is 
only funny if the receiver recognizes the resolution to the incongruity is meant to be 
funny.  
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A prime example is satire which relies not only on some level of ability to detect 
the incongruity and resolution, but also knowledge about the cultural context in which 
the satire is referring. For that reason, Stewart and Colbert may not be seen as funny or 
clever at all – some people may find them downright offensive. Moreover, resolutions 
offered may be logical, predictable or completely irrelevant. Some things are plainly not 
funny and are not meant to be funny and attempts at humor may be incorrectly encoded 
or decoded. Again, the mere existence of an incongruity and resolution does not predict 
a humorous event. The incongruity theory of humor also does not take into 
consideration intention and emotional input and responses. Further research takes into 
consideration emotion, intention, and ability to decode and encode humor. 
Physiology 
The second area of humor research is in physiological and relief theory. Humor 
is intuitively placed in conjunction with positive emotions. The use of humor is often 
associated with the presence of the emotion mirth (Martin, 2007). Humor is also 
associated with psychological well-being (Martin et al., 2003) and communication 
security in conjunction with humor ability (Miczo, 2004). Young and Bippus (2001) 
examined the impact of humorous and non-humorous hurtful messages in an 
interpersonal setting. They found humorous messages were seen as less intense and less 
hurtful. In other words, using humor seemed to lessen the severity of hurtful messages. 
Satire is often biting commentary cloaked in a humorous message, so understanding the 
impact of satire (and if it can generate third-person perception) is a goal of this project. 
The link of positive emotion and humor seems tenuous, however. Simply 
arguing humor produces a positive emotion like mirth fails to recognize sub-areas in 
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humor like satire and aggressive humor. For example, one may think it is humorous to 
ridicule someone else, but others may find it insensitive and cruel. Moreover, 
behavioral responses like smiling and laughing are not necessarily signs of mirth and 
positive emotion. People may produce nervous laughter or may smile because of a non-
verbal attempt at politeness or appeasement. 
To link humor solely with positive emotion is limiting; humor may also be a 
response to arousal. Shurcliff (1968) suggested the relief theory of humor which links 
humor to an affective relief response to an anxiety arousal. In other words, there is the 
view that the affective responses of smiling and laughter are a physiological relief 
mechanism to deal with arousal (with arousal having a valence of positive, negative, or 
neutral).   
In a clever study of affective behavior, Soussignan (2002) looked at the effect of 
smiling on message reception. Participants were asked to hold pens in their mouths to 
manipulate a forced smile or a forced frown. The results show smiling resulted in more 
positive affect when viewing a cartoon. This suggests the physiological act has an 
impact on affective responses regardless of our previous moods or intentions. However, 
the relief response theory seems too limiting as well because it is only one part of what 
we consider humorous. 
Disparagement &Affiliative 
The third research focus is known as superiority and disparagement theory, 
which takes into consideration social interaction and context. Ferguson and Ford (2008) 
explain “disparagement humor refers to remarks that (are intended to) elicit amusement 
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through the denigration, derogation, or belittlement of a given target (e.g., individuals, 
social groups, political ideologies, material possessions)” (p. 284). 
Disparagement and superiority humor is often seen as hostile, affiliative or 
aggressive (Martin, 2007). Examples of this include teasing, derision, and mockery; it 
can incorporate elements of satire and sarcasm. Research in this area focuses on 
aggressive and affiliative humor in social contexts. For instance, Miczo and Welter 
(2006) found aggressive and affiliative humor styles were linked with intercultural 
communication apprehension and ethnocentrism. In other words, we make fun of 
people we do not like or understand.  
Disparagement humor is pervasive in our culture – it is the staple of water cooler 
discussions and late-night comedy shows. There may be instances of incongruity in 
aggressive types of humor, but the overriding theme relies of social structures – us 
versus them. Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert often use hostile mockery and derision; 
fans of Stewart and Colbert are affiliative in this brand of aggressive satire.  
In hostile forms, the judgment of humor is related to the affiliation with the 
aggressor and the approved disparagement of the victim (Martin, 2007). The Daily 
Show and the Colbert Report are built on disparagement and affiliative humor. Lefcourt 
(2001) argues hostile humor can be damaging to the target of the humor even while 
those in on the joke may increase positive emotions for the joker and the group. 
Aggressive humor can also be seen as an attempt to gain a sense of superiority, however 
imagined or fleeting, from which one feels enjoyment or amusement (Ziv, 1984). Thus, 
aggressive humor is often directed at the powers that be. LaFollette and Shanks (1993) 
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argue using political satire attempts to make light of political players and political 
situations, which in turn may influence how people perceive political events. 
Stewart tends to counterbalance hostile humor with self-deprecating humor; 
Lefcourt (2001) argues “[g]enuinely funny humor, as opposed to hostile humor, is 
largely self-directed and defensive” (p. 72). One of Stewart’s main themes is claiming 
his show is not real news and he pokes fun at his show’s hyperbolic tendencies. Ziv 
(1984) suggests “a person’s ability to laugh at himself is thought of as a desirable trait 
and wins appreciation.” (p. 61) because it exudes self-awareness of strengths and 
frailties and makes us seem stronger; it also makes people bond and appreciate that 
everyone has weaknesses. Bippus (2007) found, in a study of the use of humor in a 
2004 congressional debate, self-deprecating humor was most effective with debate 
viewers. Stewart, for instance, uses self-deprecating humor when he says he is not a real 
journalist and maximizes that his show runs on the entertainment network Comedy 
Central. 
Group identification, where one identifies with either a disparaging or 
disparaged group, is an important variable in aggressive humor research. In a review of 
aggressive humor research, Zillman (1983) argues research has moved from more 
simplistic views of in-group and out-group to a more complex system of evaluation. He 
argues the disposition theory of humor goes beyond thinking of humor in terms 
reference groups, suggesting that magnitude, valence, and intensity of humor is 
dependent on the disposition toward the disparaged group. Arguably, Stewart and 
Colbert use humor that invites the audience to be a part of an in-group while the hosts 
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attack a targeted out-group (usually politicians or the news media). Humor is dependent 
on the audience’s disposition to the targeted out-group.   
Social cohesion is another important concept in aggressive and affiliative humor 
research. Humor is often at the heart of social cohesion, used to counterbalance the 
stress, violence, and isolation present in everyday life (Lefcourt, 2001). Research has 
shown humor builds bonds of social cohesion in interpersonal groups like police 
officers (Terrion & Ashforth, 2002) and chefs (Lynch, 2010). Put-down humor can 
often lead to greater social cohesion because the humor relies upon culturally acceptable 
targets for the humor. For instance, Stewart and Colbert target politicians who are seen 
as acceptable targets for criticism in a democratic system.  
Political humor, particularly anti-establishment jokes, can help people cope with 
political situations they cannot change (Pi-Sunyer, 1977). Pi-Sunyer (1977) examined 
the exchange of jokes in Franco-controlled Spain and found humor not only helped 
people deal with the hopelessness of tight political regimes, it also allowed them an 
avenue for social protest. While the U.S. is not under a dictatorial regime, those in the 
political minority may feel a sense of helplessness in terms of changing political leaders 
and policies. Arguably, the humor of Stewart and Colbert has evolved beyond just late-
night television. On October 30, 2010, Stewart and Colbert held a political rally in 
Washington, D.C. People attended to voice their opinions and concerns about the 
current political climate. Stewart, in particular, voiced his concern for both the political 
system and the responsibilities of traditional news media. This project examines the use 
of humor by The Daily Show and the Colbert Report in to define the group and form 
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social cohesion. A goal of this project is to further explore how references to groups are 

























 On any given week night, political information is available in all sorts of forms. 
CNN may have a panel of commentators, while MSNBC and FOX may be featuring 
opinionated talking heads. Flip to Comedy Central and you will likely see Jon Stewart’s 
non-verbal laden commentary of the day’s news followed by Stephen Colbert’s 
iconoclastic mockery of the American political system.  
Using a theoretical framework of third-person perception theory (Davison, 
1983), this project examines the impact on viewer’s perceptions and the potential 
influence on behaviors. Of primary interest in this project is to understand how the 
increasing legitimacy and importance of shows like The Daily Show and the Colbert 
Report are impacting audience evaluations. Moreover, the impact of fan identity is also 
explored. TPP is reviewed and applied to the political humor context. 
Overview Third-Person Perception 
Third-person perception (TPP) research is concerned with how people interpret 
the media affecting other people. Influenced by a strong tradition of media effects 
research, TPP is concerned not only with the perceptions of media influence on others 
but also the subsequent behavior modifications in response to these perceptions. 
Davison (1983), who dubbed the tendency as the third-person effect, argued:  
…this hypothesis predicts that people will tend to overestimate the influence 
that mass communications have on the attitudes and behavior of others. More 
specifically, individuals who are members of an audience that is exposed to a 
persuasive communication (whether or not this communication is intended to be 
 29 
persuasive) will expect the communication to have a greater effect on others 
than on themselves. (Davison, 1983, p. 3)   
For example, in terms of political humor, people may think because Colbert and Stewart 
are so popular, this will affect the political attitudes of their viewers. Or, people may 
think they know that Colbert and Stewart are using satire, but may think other viewers 
will be duped into believing the satire is literal. 
Davison (1983) also argued these perceived effects are not only important in and 
of themselves, but are also linked to a behavior change in the individual in response to 
perceived effects. He wrote:  
…whether or not these individuals are among the ostensible audience for the 
message, the impact that they expect this communication to have on others may 
lead them to take some action. Any effect that the communication achieves may 
thus be due not to reaction of the ostensible audience but rather to the behavior 
of those who anticipate, or think they perceive, some reaction on the part of 
others (Davison, 1983, p. 3).   
Though Davison lacked substantial data to back up his observations, the third-person 
effect hypothesis proved to be a heuristic instigator of future research on both the 
perceptual and behavioral components of TPP. This review will first address the 
perceptual research of TPP and then examine the behavioral research. 
Research on the perception component of TPP tends to focus on either 
motivational explanations (interpretations based on a motive for self enhancement) or 
cognitive explanations (attempts to understand societal impacts of media effects) (Tal-
Or, Tsfati, & Gunther, 2009). In a review of third-person research, Tal-Or and 
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colleagues (2009) suggest both motivation and cognitive considerations are intertwined 
in an individual’s perception of media effects. They argue: “motivational mechanisms 
play a more substantial role in people’s estimation, or underestimation, of media 
influences on the self, whereas cognitive mechanisms are more heavily related to 
perceptions of impact on others, especially differing types of others (Tal-Or et al., 
2009). The following explains the motivational and cognitive explanations of TPP and 
applies these concepts to political humor.  
Motivational Explanation 
Shah and Gardner (2008) argue motivation is driven by relativity, regulation, 
and reactivity, whereby we negotiate everyday life through an evaluative and reflexive 
process. An individual will take into consideration personal needs and desires in 
relation to the needs and desires of other people, act upon these needs and desires, and 
interact with others who have their own interests (Shah et al., 2008). Approaching TPP 
from a motivational perspective focuses on the constant monitoring people do of 
themselves and the people around them in an attempt to control oneself and the world 
around. 
The most pervasive motivational explanation of TPP is self-enhancement, which 
suggests people always think of themselves more positively when comparing 
themselves to other people (Meirick, 2008; Tal-Or & Tsfati, 2007; Tal-Or et al., 2009). 
Be it self-esteem bolstering or existential maintenance, people tend to view themselves 
as smarter, luckier, more clever, more aware, and less easily duped (Cohen, Mutz, Price, 
& Gunther, 1988; Gunther & Mundy, 1993; Salwen & Dupane, 2003). Gunther and 
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colleagues (2006) call this the “negative influence corollary, the tendency to see others 
as more vulnerable to negative outcomes” (p. 63).  
When confronted with a persuasive message or media message, as Davison 
originally suggested, an individual feels much more adept at negotiating the message’s 
intentions and true meaning when compared to other people. They, unlike other people, 
are in control of their own thoughts and behaviors (Perloff, 2002).  
For example, Stephen Colbert is notorious for bombastic rhetoric that is 
purposefully over the top – it is his form of social commentary. An individual may feel 
they are well equipped to understand Colbert’s humor and they are in on the joke, but 
may feel others will not understand the humor and not understand Colbert is being 
sarcastic. A few studies seem to at least allude to this notion, having found young 
people were less adept in negotiating Colbert’s humor (Baumgartner et al., 2008) and 
more conservative people tend to view Colbert as conservative (LaMarre et al., 2009). 
Looking at self-enhancement as an explanation for TPP, Cohen and colleagues 
(1988) examined the impact of defamatory persuasive messages on participants. They 
found a third-person effect in that participants perceived others would be more affected 
by the messages. Moreover, the more distant and abstract the “others” became, the more 
TPP increased (Cohen, Mutz, Price, & Gunther, 1988). The more negatively biased the 
message source was perceived, the more TPP increased. Cohen and colleagues (1988) 
argued participants felt more capable of negotiating the messages than other people. 
In their study of different media message valences, Gunther and Mundy (1993) 
also found more negative or harmful messages have higher third-person perceptions 
because people, using self-enhancement, feel more capable of defending against 
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harmful messages. When messages were deemed beneficial, third-person decreased and, 
in some cases, first-person perception (greater perceived effects on the self than others) 
increased.  
Similarly, Duck and colleagues (1995) argue self-enhancement plays a role in 
the perceptions of AIDS public service messages. They found those with greater issue 
involvement (who felt the messages were important) tended to have higher first-person 
perception. 
White and Dillon (2000) looked at self persuasion and third-person perception 
when viewing public service announcements about organ donation. They argue self 
enhancement (perceiving one’s self positively) explains their finding of first-person 
perception in terms of positive public service messages. This means that given the 
message was positive, participants felt it affected themselves more than other people 
(i.e., they were more persuaded by the organ donor message). Participants’ first-person 
perceptions were lessened when they knew they were being compared to other people. 
This was because when they knew they being compared to others, they became more 
critical of the message, and thus FPP decreased. 
Research in TPP found repeated support for a self-enhancement explanation for 
the phenomenon. Gunther and Mundy (1993) argued in terms of approaching messages, 
an optimistic bias makes one feel “more resistant to persuasion and, therefore, smarter 
than others” and “less susceptible to negative outcomes and, therefore, better off than 
others” (p. 60). Salwen and Dupane (2003) argued the two concepts are rather similar, 
with people feeling less susceptible to media influence (TPP) and people feeling luckier 
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than others (optimistic bias). However, the study found no connection between the two 
concepts and TPP was not mediated by optimistic bias (Salwen et al., 2003).  
The self-enhancement explanation of TPP is fairly consistent. However, as Paul 
and colleagues (2000) meta-analysis explained, college students show higher signs of 
TPP than non-college students in TPP research. They argue this may be due to college 
students perceiving themselves to be smarter than other people. That being said, a 
diverse range of research contexts and participants shows strong support of TPP and 
self-enhancement is considered a parsimonious explanation (Perloff, 1999). The validity 
of TPP measures are also quite consistent (Price & Tewksbury, 1996).  
Message Quality, Source, & Valence 
The motivational approach to TPP research generally tracks the increase and 
decrease of third-person perceptions given variables such as valence of message, quality 
of message, and credibility of the source (Tal-Or et al., 2009).  
Message source and message quality affect the amount of TPP. If the message is 
seen as harmful or negative, TPP tends to increase (Gunther & Mundy, 1993). If the 
source is seen as negatively biased, TPP increases (Cohen et al., 1988). Good quality 
messages and credible sources can decrease TPP (Gunther, 1991; White, 1997) and at 
times increase perceived influence on self; otherwise known as first-person perception 
(Duck, Terry, & Hogg, 1995). 
In an experiment combining the elaboration likelihood model with TPP, White 
(1997) examined the impact of issue involvement and argument strength. Results 
suggest people think other people are less able to distinguish between high quality and 
low quality persuasive messages. This employs the self-enhancement argument again, 
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suggesting people consider themselves more capable at understanding persuasive 
messages.   
Gunther (1991) examined TPP in conjunction with argument quality. He found 
people tend to accurately estimate media influence on themselves but overestimated the 
influence of media messages on other people. Moreover, it is argued other people are 
seen as being unable to discern a credible source from a non-credible source. Gunther 
also looked at the trustworthiness of the message source and suggests attribution theory 
explains people perceive other people do not take into account the intentions of the 
message source. This was found to be the case even when the others were fairly similar 
to the individual respondent. 
Using AIDS public service messages as a context, Duck and colleagues (1995) 
examined TPP in conjunction with message quality They found low quality messages 
resulted in greater TPP while high-quality messages were seen as being more persuasive 
for the respondents (i.e. higher first-person perception).  
The impact of different types of media has also been studied in conjunction with 
TPP. Banning and Sweetser (2007) looked at differences between traditional media and 
online blog media in terms of media influence. The study found source of the media 
produced no discernable differences in TPP levels. 
A principal concern for the interpretation of political humor is the perceived 
quality of the source. Stewart and Colbert are often referred to as fake news (Jones, 
2005), so how does this influence TPP in terms of source credibility? As the popularity 
and influence of hosts like Stewart and Colbert continue to rise, it is not unheard of for 
them to be considered highly credible sources. Moreover, both Stewart and Colbert 
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have won numerous awards for quality, including the Peabody Awards for journalism 
(Stewart in 2004, Colbert in 2007) (www.peabody.uga.edu). A number of trends can be 
considered. First, sources deemed more credible tend to generate less TPP (Gunther, 
1991). Second, messages deemed to be high quality and include strong arguments tend 
to generate less TPP (Banning & Sweetser, 2007; Duck et al., 1995; White, 1997).  
This project compares political humor shows to more traditional news sources. 
For both political comedy and news, when the source is perceived as more credible, 
TPP will be lower compared to when the source is perceived as less credible. However, 
the difference should be greater for political comedy. It is argued when a person 
perceives a political humor source to be highly credible, there should be a higher first-
person effect.  
This is a function of the nature of the humor – some people understand the 
humor and some people do not. A person who understands the humor and finds it funny 
will perceive the host to have high credibility and will experience greater first-person 
perception. Quality of message functions in the same manner, with political humor 
producing more TPP than news for low-quality messages and less TPP for high-quality 
messages. Given this, it is predicted: 
H1: Source credibility will moderate the relationship between message type 
(political humor vs. news) and TPP such that as credibility increases TPP 
will decrease, but the decrease will be greater for political humor than 
news. 
H2: Quality of message will moderate the relationship between message type 
(political humor vs. news) and TPP such that as the quality of message 
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increases TPP will decrease, but the decrease will be greater for political 
humor than news. 
Message valence (the positive or negative tone) is another important component 
in TPP research. Gunther and Mundy (1993) examined optimistic bias in conjunction 
with message valence. They found prohibitive and negative messages (i.e., avoid bad 
things) increased TPP while promotional and positive messages (i.e., approach good 
things) either decreased TPP or even resulted in greater individual influence known as 
first-person perception (Gunther et al., 1993).  
Duck and Mullin (1995) conducted multiple studies using three valences of 
media messages (negative, positive, and public service) in conjunction with TPP toward 
either vague others or distant others. They found similar findings, with negative 
messages creating more TPP than positive messages. It was also found public service 
ads (promoting pro-social and beneficial messages) tended to increase first-person 
perception because people felt it was good to be influenced by these messages (Duck et 
al., 1995; Duck et al., 1995).  
In terms of political humor, message valence is not always clear. If an individual 
laughs and feels a part of the affiliative humor (positive affect), then humorous 
messages will potentially lower TPP. However, if an individual finds the humor crass, 
unfunny, and divisive (negative affect), then the humorous messages will potentially 
increase TPP. Past research suggests the humor of shows like the Colbert Report is not 
always decoded by an audience the same way (Baumgartner et al., 2008; LaMarre et al., 
2009). Hoorens and Ruiter (1996) argue that desirable messages will have greater 
effects on the self (FPP) rather than perceived effects on others (TPP). However, as 
 37 
shown in Meirick (2004), the amount of TPP and FPP from perceived desirable 
messages is contingent upon the perceiver. Thus, the amount of TPP is likely dependent 
on whether or not the message is considered humorous and dependent on affiliation 
with the source (in this case, the political humor host).  
Messages seen as humorous are likely to generate TPP, but the direction is 
unclear. Given that political humor is affiliative, TPP will arguably increase as 
humorousness increases because people will feel like the joke is insider information that 
“other” people will not understand. Furthermore, humorousness for political humor is 
fitting and appropriate while humorousness in news is less appropriate. So there should 
be a distinct difference between political humor and news in terms of humorousness and 
TPP. So it is predicted:  
H3: Humorousness of message will moderate the relationship between 
message type (political humor vs. news) and TPP such that as perceived 
humorousness increases TPP will increase, but the increase will be 
greater for political humor than news. 
From past research, the interplay of credibility and humor is not clear. It is 
possible humor may work to diffuse the ill-effects of low credibility. Moreover, 
political comedy shows may be seen as fairly credible sources even for those who do 
not find them funny. So the followed research question is posed: 
RQ1: Is TPP generated when a comedic source is seen as a) a less credible 





Defining “other people” is an important variable in TPP research. The social 
distance corollary suggests the further removed other people are from an individual, the 
greater the perceived impact of the media (Cohen et al., 1988; Duck et al., 1995; 
Eveland, Nathanson, Detenber, & McLeod, 1999). For example, an individual may not 
think a media message impacts themselves or their immediate friends, but they do 
perceive the message impacting more abstract groups of people (e.g., the general 
public).  
Social distance may be an important variable in the magnitude of TPP generated 
by political humor shows. The Daily Show and the Colbert Report have a target 
demographic of young and liberal-leaning viewers. Given this study will employ young 
participants, social distance may be a considerable factor in TPP levels. This may be 
especially true when asked to speculate on older viewers. 
When social distance increases, TPP increases – so those most immediate to us 
are not perceived to be as susceptible as those who are more abstract and removed from 
us (Cohen et al., 1988; Duck/Mullin et al., 1995). Consequently, when an individual is 
asked to compare themselves to the general public, TPP tends to be higher (Eveland, 
Nathanson, Detenber, & McLeod, 1999). This phenomenon has been found in a number 
of studies (Gibbon & Durkin, 1995; McLeod, Eveland, & Nathanson, 1997).  
Moreover, as White (1997) found, the more distant the “other” is, the more 
people feel these others are incapable of discerning between good quality and poor 
quality persuasive messages. They placed distance others on a spectrum from fellow 
students to other university students to non-student residents.  
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 Duck and Mullin (1995), in two studies on message reception, found support for 
increased TPP as social distance increases. This was particularly true for those who 
were defined rather abstractly, as in the general public. The social distance phenomenon 
was also supported in terms of TPP and violent media (Hoffner et al., 2001). 
Eveland and colleagues (1999) examined social distance in conjunction with 
perceived likelihood of exposure. They argued people make inferences about whether or 
not a group will actually be exposed to a certain type of media (violent rap songs and 
violent movies). The findings suggest likelihood of actually being exposed to the media 
(in this case whether other students would be exposed) was a better predictor of TPP 
than mere distance. 
Likelihood of exposure is an important variable in TPP research. People take 
into account the likelihood the media will be consumed by certain segments of the 
population. McLeod and colleagues (1997) found a link between TPP and support for 
censorship in a study of explicit rap lyrics. Interestingly, they found support for 
likelihood of exposure to influence TPP – there was a distinction between likely targets 
for rap music consumption and the population in general. 
To further understand the mechanism at work in the target corollary, Meirick 
(2005) examined social distance, perceived exposure, and perceived predisposition. 
While social distance was at least partially supported as in previous studies, perceived 
exposure affecting TPP levels was only a factor in negative messages (there was no 
relationship between perceived exposure and perceived effects for pro-social messages). 
Instead, an argument was made for perceived predisposition to a message relating to 
perceived effects for both anti-social and pro-social messages. 
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Social distance and likelihood of exposure may play a role in how individuals 
perceive political humor to affect various audiences. The participants for this study are 
generally young, college-aged people who are one of the main consumers of this genre 
(Feldman, 2007).  
Taking into account both group identification and social distance, it is predicted 
college students may think the general public will be less able to decode the comedic 
messages. This should particularly be the case for political humor compared with the 
effects of political news consumption. Moreover, young viewers may perceive distant 
others to be less likely to be exposed to political comedy (i.e, the general public may be 
perceived to watch traditional news more than political comedy shows). Therefore, the 
following hypotheses are predicted: 
H4: Social distance will moderate the relationship between message type 
(political humor vs. news) and TPP such that as social distance increases 
TPP will increase, but the increase will be greater for political humor 
than news. 
H5: Perceived likelihood of exposure will moderate the relationship between 
message type (political humor vs. news) and TPP such that as perceived 
likelihood of exposure increases TPP will increase, but the increase will 
be greater for political humor than news. 
Cognitive Explanation 
Davison (1996), in a review of TPP research, argued “the third-person effect 
was not a manifestation of a single psychological tendency, but was a complex reaction 
that varied with the type of communication, the characteristics of the individual, and the 
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situation” (p. 114). As such, the cognitive explanation of TPP suggests people 
constantly evaluate how the media is affecting society.  
Eveland and colleagues (1999) argue people tend to make inferences about the 
perceived impact of the media, suggesting people create explanations about “media 
effects in which exposure is strongly and directly related to media impacts” (Eveland et 
al., 1999, p. 290). The cognitive mechanism of TPP works as such that people project 
how the media are influencing other people and they modify their attitudes based on 
those projections.  
In a review of TPP research, Perloff (1993) finds the overestimation of the 
media’s effect on others is often greater than the underestimation of the media’s effect 
on the self. It is as if the individual cannot conceive of the impact the socially-
constructed world of the media has on them. People assume others are more influenced 
by what they see as a very powerful and manipulative media (Price, Huang & 
Tewksbury, 1997). 
For instance, Price and Stroud (2005) found increased levels of TPP increased 
desires to prohibit election night projections. The study found people perceive media 
polls have a greater effect on other people and thus adds to the negativity toward the use 
of political polls.  
Perceptions of the self are not necessarily mutually exclusive from cognitive 
evaluations. The components of self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1987) suggest we are 
constantly monitoring our own behavior (and future behaviors) in relation to how others 
perceive us and how we perceive their behavior. The cognitive mechanism of TPP and 
subsequent behavior modifications function similarly.  
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Salwen and Dupagne (2001) take into consideration self-perceived knowledge 
as a predictor of TPP. They found self-perceived knowledge was not only a better 
predictor of TPP than demographic variables, but it also works to explain the 
relationship between TPP and demographic variables. More specifically, they argue 
people are more likely to use self-perceived knowledge (the belief by an individual of 
their superior understanding of television violence) rather than demographic 
information when comparing themselves to other people. 
This project is interested in two areas in particular – the effect of group 
identification and perceptions of media bias. It is argued group identification is 
manifested in a number of ways for The Daily Show and Colbert Report. People 
watching these shows may identify as fans, they may assume young people are the 
primary consumers of the show, and they may interpret the political information of the 
show through traditional conservative-liberal lenses. Perceptions of media bias may be 
influenced by the perceived intention and ideology of the Stewart and Colbert. 
Social Identity 
It is arguable because The Daily Show and Colbert Report are built around 
charismatic hosts, this creates a community brought together by fandom. It is celebrity 
and entertainment that draws them to the show, not necessarily a desire for news or 
civic engagement. Research of the shows has shown many of the viewers, especially in 
the early years of the show, tended to be younger and have less political knowledge 
(Prior, 2005; Feldman, 2007). 
Tsfati and Cohen (2003) argue “communication processes that provide us with 
social information about how others judge us, our group status, or achievements will 
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potentially cause a behavioral adjustment” (p. 712). As such, personal and group 
characteristics come into play in determining how and if the media message will have 
an effect. This includes relevance of the message to a group - the more relevant a 
message is to a group, the greater the impact on the group (Matera & Salwen, 1999). 
Identification with a social group also influences perceived effects of in-group and out-
group messages (Duck et al., 1995; Elder, Douglas, & Sutton, 2006).  
There are a number of contexts in which groups have been analyzed in TPP 
research. One area is the comparison of in-groups and out-groups. Elder and colleagues 
(2006) found group identification impacted TPP levels. The study examined social 
distance and group identity, finding messages favoring an out-group resulted in higher 
TPP with social distance. As might be expected, messages favoring an in-group resulted 
in higher levels of TPP for in-group members compared to more distant others.  
Lambe and McLeod (2006) examined in-group and out-group perceptions of 
media exposure. Across contexts, young people perceived media exposure for other 
young people (in-group) would be similar to their own. As might be suspected, young 
people perceptions of middle-aged adults (out-group) led to greater TPP levels. 
Magnitude of TPP is also influenced by socially-held beliefs about what social 
groups are most impacted by the media. For instance, children are often seen as 
vulnerable to violent media. Research on TPP and media violence is an example of how 
social identity works in terms of perceptions. For example, if children are perceived to 
be more susceptible to media violence, the TPP will be higher for people concerned 
about children viewing violent media (Scharrer, 2002). Even young people think other 
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young people (especially kids younger than themselves) are more susceptible to the 
violence in video games (Scharrer & Leone, 2006; 2008).  
Race and ethnicity as reference groups has been shown to influence the 
magnitude of TPP. Matera and Salwen (1999) looked at the influence of issue salience 
(about illegal immigration) on levels of TPP, finding issue salience increased TPP. They 
also took into consideration ethnic identity and TPP, noting while there was no 
difference between Hispanic and non-Hispanic respondents in the direction of the TPP 
effect, there were differences in salience and magnitude of TPP. Hispanic respondents 
perceived less TPP effect on others and less media effects on themselves when 
compared to non-Hispanics. 
Price and colleagues (1998) found a link between group identification (Jewish 
students) and higher levels of TPP when confronted with a pro-Nazi advertisement. The 
findings suggest those with a large involvement in an issue felt they faced greater 
consequences from the media artifact. The study found this was more a media effect on 
the self rather than a perceived effect on others (i.e., desire to ban the advertisements 
was not a strategic act to ban others from viewing them). 
In a similar study, Perloff (1989) examined the impact of identity and affiliation 
when examining the TPP impact of news coverage. The study asked pro-Israel, pro-
Palestinian, and neutral participants about their perceptions of news coverage of an 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict. As is to be expected, those with an affiliation (both pro-
Israel and pro-Palestinian participants) expected the news would sway neutral others to 
the other side and only negative information would be recalled by neutral others. 
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In the political context, Price and colleagues (1997) found conservatives and 
liberals exhibit different levels of TPP, but it may have more to do with group bias than 
personal characteristics. Their study explored the variations in magnitude of TPP related 
to political ideology, media use, and media schemas. When compared to liberals, 
conservatives under-estimate the media’s effect on themselves and exhibited higher 
levels of TPP. However, it is argued the mechanism at work is in-group bias – a form of 
self-serving interest that underestimates the impact of good news for the in-group 
(preferred political party) and over-estimates the impact of bad news for the in-group. 
So people take group identification into account when considering the influence of the 
media. 
Group identification is also present in the perceived impact of political ads. 
Using Bush and Dukakis presidential ads, Cohen and Davis (1991) examined TPP for 
negative ads. They found when a supported candidate was attacked, participants 
reported higher levels of TPP. When an opposing candidate was attacked, participants 
reported higher levels of first person perception. In other words, for ads attacking a 
supported candidate, people feel others will be more influenced; ads attacking an 
opposing candidate make people feel as though they personally are more influenced. 
This is an early study in TPP but it shows group identification (in this case Democrat 
and Republican) is an important variable influencing levels of perception.  
The Colbert Report and The Daily Show contain elements of group 
identification. First, both use affiliative humor that either includes audience members 
who understand and are in on the joke, or excludes those who do not understand the 
joke. Secondly, both shows are helmed by popular celebrities that people are either fans 
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of (in-group) or not fans of (out-group). Those considered fans of each show should 
have higher levels of TPP when asked to consider non-fan viewers. The affiliative 
nature of political humor can arguably create a stronger bond between humor host and 
audience compared to news and audience. News, too, has its fans. But news (as a genre) 
is not driven by singular host. Rather news incorporates a revolving cast of anchors, 
reporters, and pundits. It is arguable that when comparing political comedy to political 
news, political comedy should produce higher levels of TPP. Moreover, people may fall 
back on other reference groups such as political ideology when making judgments about 
media influence.  
H6: Fan identification moderates the relationship between message type 
(political humor vs. news) and TPP such that as political humor 
appreciation decreases, TPP will increase, but the increase will be greater 
for political humor than news. 
H7: Political ideology moderates the relationship between message type 
(political humor vs. news) and TPP such that as conservativeness 
increases, TPP will increase, but the increase will be greater for political 
humor than news. 
Perceptions of Bias 
Perception of bias is also an important factor in audience negotiations of 
political humor. Davison (1983) wrote we assume the arguments against our side will 
have an undue amount of influence on other people and those arguments will be much 
more salient for them. There is a link between perceptions of bias and TPP. Source 
motivations (what they are trying to accomplish with the message) are often taken into 
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account (Gunther, 1991). If a person perceives a source to be negatively biased, this 
tends to increase TPP (Cohen et al., 1988). When comparing neutral and biased 
material, people tend to have higher TPP levels when they perceive a message to be 
biased (Gibbon & Durkin, 1995).   
Perceptions of media bias may be particularly important in the political context. 
Banning (2006) found Republicans tend to have larger TPP compared to Democrats. 
His study examined the connection between past voting behavior and TPP. Banning 
argues Republicans having a larger TPP supports the view that Republicans are more 
skeptical of the media and think other people are more easily persuaded by media 
sources. The study also found support for the prediction that given negative messages 
are more likely to elicit TPP, then perceiving bias (thus perceiving negative) also 
increases TPP.  
Given that Stewart and Colbert focus on political material, it is likely that some 
people will see them as biased. Moreover, they make no claims of objectivity and 
frequently have a liberal bias to their arguments. Given that news media is often seen as 
biased, political comedy should be seen as even more biased. Political comedy should 
produce higher levels of TPP when the source (Stewart or Colbert) is seen as more 
biased than a generic political news story. It is predicted: 
H8: Perceptions of source bias moderates the relationship between message 
type (political humor vs. news) and TPP such that as perception of bias 
increases, TPP will increase, but the increase will be greater for political 
humor than news.  
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TPP & Behavior 
Though not as widely researched as the perceptual component of TPP, the 
behavioral component of TPP potentially elucidates how people might act on their 
perceptions. Gunther and Storey (2003) have dubbed this behavioral component the 
influence of presumed influence of the media. Behaviors associated with TPP include 
motivation to censor harmful media (Davison, 1983), but also include adjusting 
behavior in response to perceptions of others behaviors (Gunther et al., 2003; Tal-Or et 
al., 2009). Though behaviors may not be overt actions, but simply changes in attitudes 
or perceptions (Tal-Or et al., 2009). Innovative research on the behavioral component of 
TPP is attempting to expand contexts and actions associated with media influence 
(Golan, 2008). 
Censorship 
Censorship behavior is concerned with preventing the impact of harmful media 
on others (Davison, 1983). For instance, media content may be deemed subversive 
inspiring a person to prevent the consumption of that media by others. In terms of 
viewers watching Stewart and Colbert, a censorship behavior of TPP may prevent a 
person from forwarding a clip of the show or posting warning message on the show’s 
webpage comment section.  
Davison (1983) argues censorship is driven by the need to prevent harmful 
media from corrupting or ruining society, motivated by the attitude that “[i]t is the 
general public that must be protected” (p. 14). The link between censorship and TPP has 
been studied in a number of context including violence (Rojas, Shah, & Faber, 1996; 
McLeod et al., 1997; Hoffner & Buchanan, 2002), sexually-explicit media (Gunther, 
 49 
1995; Chia, Lu, & McLeod, 2004), and controversial advertising (Price, Tewksbury, & 
Huang, 1998; Youn, Faber, & Shah, 1999).  
Research on media violence is an example of combining TPP and censorship 
behavior. Hoffner and colleagues (1999) examined the proclivity of people to want to 
censor violent content on television. In a survey of community residents, they found 
desire to censor violence was linked with perceptions of increased aggression. They 
argue people have a desire to protect their communities and thus support censorship 
when they feel television is unduly impacting other people. They also looked at mean-
world perceptions (an internal feeling about the dangerousness of the world) and found 
a first-person effect for mean world was linked to greater support of censorship. 
Research on pornography and sexually-explicit media also links TPP and 
support of censorship. McLeod and colleagues (1997) found a connection between TPP 
and support for censorship in a study of explicit rap lyrics. Chia and colleagues (2004) 
found TPP of sexually-explicit material propagated by the media was linked to a desire 
for punitive censorship (to punish the media for harm caused by showing the material). 
Similarly, Youn and colleagues (2000) found a link between perceived effects of 
gambling advertising on other people and support for advertising restrictions. 
The support for censorship is likely issue- and context-dependent, which is what 
Salwen and Dupagne (1999) found in their analysis of issue type and TPP behavioral 
level. They measured for TPP on three different issues: media violence, televised trials, 
and negative political advertising. They found media violence, and perceptions of 
immorality) was a strong link to TPP influenced support of censorship. A feeling of the 
media’s general influence was linked to restrictions on trials and political advertising.  
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In the context of entertainment media, Paek and colleagues (2008) looked at 
different content (entertainment, propaganda, and informative) in conjunction with 
support for restrictions. Using both student and non-student participants, the study 
found greater support for restrictions of propaganda (or harmful news media in a 
political context) compared to entertainment media. The authors argue when the media 
is perceived to be a watchdog for the public, harmful information media use was 
regarded more severely than media that was considered simply entertainment. 
Interestingly, non-students tended to support higher restrictions for entertainment media 
while students tended to support higher restrictions for information and propaganda 
media. The authors argue students regard entertainment media (like The Daily Show) to 
be legitimate sources of information while an older generation may not.   
In the political context, Salwen (1998), in a study conducted during the 1996 
presidential election, found TPP was linked to greater message restrictions. Using a 
nationwide poll, the study found a link between campaign messages and TPP, with a 
subsequent support for message restrictions. The author argues this was likely due to 
paternalistic tendency of the audience – they did not feel impacted but were worried 
about protecting other people (Salwen, 1998).  
Other research supports paternalism as at least a partial explanation for media 
restrictions (Rojas et al., 1996). Rojas and colleagues (1996) used general media, 
violent television, and pornography as a context for examining TPP and support for 
media censorship. The study found support for censorship increased as TPP levels 
increased. The authors argue as TPP increases for media perceived as deviant, people 
are compelled to prevent harmful media from affecting audiences. 
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A paternalism explanation is not always supported, however. Salwen and 
Driscoll (1997) found legitimacy of the issues covered in the media resulted in less 
desire for media restriction. They explain some issues are considered too legitimate 
(and have high normative importance) to be restricted. 
Golan and Banning (2008) argue for a reasoned action explanation instead of a 
paternalism explanation for some instances of TPP behavior modification. Looking of 
public service announcements (PSA), they found as TPP increases, the perception 
people would act charitably also increased. Moreover, as TPP increased for others being 
affected by charitable PSA’s, people also believed their own behavior would also be 
more charitable.  
Research on censorship and content restrictions has primarily looked at media 
that may be considered harmful (like pornography and violence). Media that is funny 
and entertaining and not immediately threatening on the surface may confound the TPP-
censorship connection. At least one study suggests perceived harm of entertainment 
media appears to be generational, with younger people perceiving less harm than older 
people (Paek, et al., 2008). Arguably the show’s context as entertainment and humor 
may override the perceived harm, thereby minimizing TPP and subsequent content 
restrictions.  
Comparing news and political humor, news seen as more harmful should have a 
greater effect than political humor. This is because news is generally viewed as more 
serious and should produce greater levels of alarm at the presence of harmful effects. It 
is predicted: 
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H9: Perceptions of negative impact moderates the relationship between 
message type (political humor vs. news) and TPP such that as negative 
impact increases, TPP will increase, but the increase will be greater for 
news than for political humor. 
Presumed Influence 
Though highlighted in Davison’s (1983) original study, behavioral research has 
moved away from censorship toward other behaviors influenced by the media’s 
presumed influence (Gunther et al., 2003). Gunther and Storey (2003) coined the phrase 
presumed influence in a study that found people presume the media will impact other 
people and adjust their behavior to address that perception. Research on presumed 
influence has been examined in many contexts, including health news (Wei, Lo, & Lu, 
2008), drug advertising (Huh & Langteau, 2007a; 2007b), smoking behavior (Gunther, 
Bolt, Borzekowski, Liebhart, & Dillard, 2006), body image (Park, 2005), and political 
elections (Banning, 2006; Golan, Banning & Lundy, 2008).  
Different than censorship behavior, coordination behavior is concerned with 
modifying one’s actions in response to predicted actions of others who have already 
been effected by a media message (Tal-Or et al., 2009). For example, Tewksbury and 
colleagues (2004) found, in response to Y2K stories, respondents took into 
consideration how other people may be over-preparing for potential anarchy. In a 1999 
public survey about the threat level and anxiety caused by the Y2K computer bug, the 
study asked about intentions to prepare for the threat. The study links TPP (the belief 
others were over-preparing for Y2K) at least partially to respondents’ behavioral 
intentions. 
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At times, behavior may be simply changing their attitude in response to 
perceptions of others attitudes about a media message. White and Dillon (2000) found 
people tend to moderate their behaviors in response to media coverage of other people 
moderating their behaviors. When viewing positive public service messages and taking 
into account the reactions of other people (as reported by the media), they found an 
increase in first-person perception and self persuasion.  
An important context area for presumed media influence research is in health 
communication. In their seminal article, Gunther and Storey (2003) present the 
influence of presumed influence model. Using data from a health campaign in Nepal, 
the authors found evidence for an indirect media effect on the general population even 
though they were not the intended audience. The information campaigns were targeted 
at improving health care workers conduct toward patients, but the indirect effect 
resulted in more positive perceptions of health care workers from the general public.  
In Taiwan, Wei and colleagues (2008) examined the presumed influence of 
avian flu news on the likelihood participants would act to avoid the flu or seek out 
medication. Interestingly, the study found TPP actually lessened the likelihood 
participants would act because they perceived their chances of contracting the avian flu 
as more unlikely than other people. It was only when the media was perceived as having 
a higher first-person effect that participants were more likely to adopt preventative 
measures. 
In the U.S., Gunther and colleagues (2006) studied the relationship between 
adolescent smoking adoption and presumed media influence. Data collected from 
middle school students suggests pro-smoking messages create a presumed media 
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influence on adolescent peers and increased perceptions that these peers were smoking. 
The authors argue the presumed influence of pro-smoking messages influences 
perceptions of peer norms (i.e., everyone else is smoking) which can lead to behavioral 
adoption of smoking. Moreover, the study found pro-smoking ads were seen as more 
influential than anti-smoking ads.   
To further apply the model to health communication, Huh and Langteau (2007a, 
2007b) examined the presumed influence of direct-to-consumer drug advertising. The 
first study distinguished between expert (doctors) and non-expert (patients) viewers; 
this was further parsed into expert consumers and non-expert consumers (Huh & 
Langteau, 2007a). They found expert consumers exhibited the highest levels of TPP. 
Expert consumers presumed the general public would be greatly influenced by the 
advertising, while novice consumers and expert doctors did not exhibit the same 
perceptions. The second study examined the relationship between presumed influence 
of drug advertising and support for regulation of the ads (Huh & Langteau, 2007b). 
They found presumed influence was linked with greater support of ad regulation and a 
negative view of patients requesting the advertised drugs. 
In politics, people may presume the media have influenced other voters and 
choose to vote strategically to counter-balance others behaviors (Golan, Banning & 
Lundy, 2008). Golan and colleagues (2008) examined TPP and behavioral effects of 
political ads from the 2004 presidential campaign (Kerry and Bush). In addition to 
finding support for TPP, they also found people are inclined to modify their behavior 
based on the perceived effect of political ads on other people. This was particular true if 
a person perceives other people to be politically ignorant. For instance, a Kerry 
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supporter may feel people are duped by a Bush ad and subsequently take action (in this 
case by voting) to counteract the persuasiveness of Bush advertising.   
Cohen and colleagues (2008) argue presumed influence is a reason why 
politicians modify their behavior based on predictions and perceptions of the media’s 
impact on public opinion. Politicians have presumed influence on the media and are 
thus “likely to compete for media coverage because they believe that media coverage 
influences the public and that it is a prerequisite for reelection” (Cohen et al., 2008, p. 
333). 
Cohen and Tsfati (2009) examined the potential of presumed media influence to 
inspire people to vote strategically. Though the act of strategic voting (i.e. estimating 
the actions of other voters and acting in strategic response) is still rare, there is evidence 
presumed media influence can impact voting behavior. 
Party and ideological identification also impact TPP behavior. In a study on 
voting behavior, Banning (2006) found support for a link between TPP and voting, but 
it was not in the direction predicted - as likelihood to vote increased, TPP decreased. 
Republicans had larger TPP compared to Democrats and found media perceived as 
biased increased TPP. 
 Presumed influence has also been studied outside of the U.S. In a study of 
biased media and TPP, Tsfati (2007) found when minorities believe people in the 
majority are influenced by a biased media, it increases minority alienation. Moreover, 
Tsfati and Cohen (2005) found in a study of Gaza settlers, the presumed influence of a 
biased media can lead people to violent protest and feelings of political inefficacy. 
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There are elements of presumed influence in political humor. Gunther and 
Storey (2003) argue not only do the media influence how we perceive things, but we 
take into account how these influences impact others behavior and subsequently adjust 
our own behavior. It is arguable people will perceive the popularity and celebrity of 
Stewart and Colbert to have a presumed influence, thus creating a bandwagon effect 
with their shows. For this reason, political humor should create a stronger presumed 
influence when compared to news.  
H10: TPP level moderates the relationship between message type (political 
humor vs. news) and behavior such that as TPP increases, behavior will 

















This project compared political humor and television political news. The 
political humor condition was composed of three clips edited together from The Daily 
Show, Real Time with Bill Maher, and The Colbert Report. The news condition was 
composed of three clips edited together from Hardball with Chris Matthews, Final 
Word with Lawrence O’Donnell, and Chuck Todd all from MSNBC.  
The clips were chosen from MSNBC for a number of reasons. First, Stewart, 
Colbert, and Maher all have a slight liberal leaning in their viewpoints and the tone of 
their programs. MSNBC was chosen to match this tone. Second, three male news 
anchors were chosen to correspond with three male hosts in the political humor 
condition. Third, three of the more popular male anchors from MSNBC were chosen in 
order to prevent a celebrity (political humor) versus non-celebrity (news) imbalance. 
Fourth, MSNBC builds news hours around a particular host with a particular personality 
(like Matthews, O’Donnell, and Todd). These shows tend to include editorial 
commentary from the hosts and regular segments. This format corresponds with the 
editorial commentary and segments shown in the political humor shows. 
Participants 
Study participants (n = 342) were drawn from students enrolled in 
communication courses at a university in the central United States. Participants were 
offered extra credit for participation. Overall, participants were 46% male and 54% 
female with the median age being 21 years. In terms of ethnic or racial background, 
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77% were white, 6 % Hispanic, 4.7% African American, 4.7 % American Indian, 4.7% 
Asian, and 2.9 % other. 
Materials and Procedure 
Two videos were created – one for the political humor condition and one for the 
news condition. Three separate shows (The Daily Show, Real Time with Bill Maher, and 
The Colbert Report) were chosen in order to eliminate the effect of a particular host. 
This project is interested in political humor, not just the “Jon Stewart” effect. Therefore, 
clips drawn from the monologue sections of the shows (aired in March 2011) were 
edited together for a total length of eleven minutes. All three segments focused on the 
2012 election (both Republican and Democratic campaigns). In order to control for 
political perspective (the political humor shows all having a liberal slant), MSNBC was 
chosen as the news source. To be equivalent with the political humor condition, three 
hosts were chosen (Chris Matthews, Lawrence O’Donnell, and Chuck Todd). Time 
length (eleven minutes) and subject matter (the 2012 election) were equivalent.  
The study was advertised to recruit participants. The survey was single phased 
and computer-based utilizing the online survey program Qualtrics (see Appendix A for 
survey items). Participants were first asked to complete an informed consent page in 
which they agree to the terms of the study. A set of preliminary questions obtained 
information about political identification and fan identification. Participants were then 
randomly assigned to a condition (news or political humor). After the preliminary 
questions, participants were asked to view the clip; the video was embedded into the 
online survey. After viewing the video, respondents were asked quiz questions about the 
clip to ensure that they viewed the entire clip. They were then asked to answer questions 
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about the videos and the sources (including credibility, message quality, bias, social 
distance, likelihood of exposure, negative impact, and TPP). The survey concluded with 
demographic questions. 
Measures  
 Third-person perception. To measure TPP, this study used a variation on the 
basic 2-question set used by Cohen and colleagues (1997). A 7-point Likert-type scale 
(1 = very little and 7 = very much) was used to evaluate perceptions of self and 
perceptions of others. The two questions included “this video will impact my attitudes” 
(M = 2.00, SD = .997) and “this video will impact attitudes of others” (M = 3.20, SD = 
.953). The TPP dependent variable was created subtracting self from others. In order to 
evaluate interaction hypotheses, TPP was split into low, medium and high. The mean 
for TPP was established as medium, low was one standard deviation below the mean, 
and high was one standard deviation above the mean. 
Social distance TPP. Measures of differing TPP levels (based on social 
distance) were used for hypothesis three. The measure was adapted from previous TPP 
research (Cohen, et al, 1997). Participants were asked TPP perceptions for their friends 
(M = 3.74, SD = 1.41), other students at their university (M = 4.41, SD = 1.31), and 
general population of young people age 20 to 30 (M = 4.60, SD = 1.387). Repeated-
measures dependent variables were created using the various others minus self. 
Source credibility. A source evaluation scale, modified from McCroskey’s 
(1966) source credibility scale, was used to evaluate credibility in hypothesis one (M = 
4.28, SD = 1.02). Participants were asked to evaluate the credibility of the sources in the 
video. Questions consisting of 7-point semantic differential scales included items: 
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right/wrong, negative/positive, unfavorable/favorable, unacceptable/acceptable, 
foolish/wise, bad/good, not intelligent/intelligent, unreliable/reliable, 
untrustworthy/trustworthy, unqualified/qualified, not credible/credible, immoral/moral, 
self-centered/not self-centered, incompetent/competent, unethical/ethical, unfair/fair, 
and biased/unbiased. The scale was reliable (α = 0.955). 
Message quality. A measure for quality of message was developed to address 
hypothesis two. The measure (M = 4.52, SD = 1.16) was adapted from message 
evaluation measures used in previous TPP studies (Banning & Sweetser, 2007; White, 
1997). Using a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly agree and 7 = strongly disagree), 
participants were asked to rate the quality of the message based on the following 
criteria: logical, clear, easy to understand, present information factually, and overall 
quality. The scale reliability was α = 0.884. 
Humorousness. Participants were asked to evaluate how humorous they found 
the video. This was used for research question one. Participants were asked how they 
feel about the clip (M = 4.06, SD = 1.69). Using a semantic differential scale, 
participants gauged whether the clip was funny/unfunny, silly/not silly, hilarious/not 
hilarious, and amusing/not amusing. The scale reliability had α = 0.894.  
Perceived likelihood of exposure. In order to address hypothesis four, 
participants were asked to gauge the perceived likelihood that other groups of people 
would be exposed to the video content. These groups include friends (M = 4.01, SD = 
1.62), other students at their university (M = 4.82, SD = 1.47), general public aged 20-
30 (M = 4.74, SD = 1.43), and general public aged 40-50 (M = 4.15, SD = 1.48). A 7-
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point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree) was used to gauge 
the likelihood that these groups would be exposed to the video content. 
Fan of humor. To address hypothesis five, a measure of appreciation for 
political humor (M = 4.38, SD = 1.25) using a modified version of the Hmielowski and 
colleagues (2011) affinity for political humor scale was used. Using a 7-point Likert-
type scale (1 = strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree), the measure asks various 
reasons for being a fan of political humor. The scale was reliable (α = 0.953).  
Political identification. To address hypothesis six, participants were asked to 
identify where they fall on a spectrum, which included very conservative (5.8 %), 
conservative (26.6 %), lean conservative (17.8 %), neutral (18.1 %), lean liberal 
(15.2 %), liberal (13.2 %), and very liberal (3.2 %). The overall participant group leaned 
conservative (M = 4.37, SD = 1.61).  
Source bias. To address hypothesis seven, participants were asked about their 
perceptions of source bias for the video (M = 2.85, SD = 1.23). A source bias scale was 
adapted from hostile media effect research (Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985). Using 7-
point Likert-type scale, participants were asked to judge their perceptions of the bias of 
the media source (see survey in appendix). Alpha reliability was .725. 
Negative impact. To address hypothesis eight, participants were asked about 
their perceptions of negative impact of the video (M = 3.27, SD = 1.06). Negative 
impact was asked for multiple reference groups (friends, other students, general public 
20-30, and general public 40-50). The scale reliability had α = 0.872. 
 Behavioral intent. Past presumed influence research measured intention to 
proceed (with a behavior) based on the belief other people had been influenced by the 
 62 
media (Golan, et al, 2008). Adapted from this research, a behavioral intention measure 
was developed to address hypothesis nine (M = 3.58, SD = 1.19). Questions were asked 
concerning the likelihood that participants would engage (based on watching the video) 
in the following behaviors: watch clips like the one you saw, recommend this video to a 
friend, forward a clip from this show, post a clip of this show on Facebook, post a 
comment to the shows website, watch other episodes of this show online, post a 
comment about this show on Twitter, watch others news programs like CNN, read other 
news content online, engage in a discussion about the topics on the show, and become 


















 In sum, results were mixed, but interesting trends did emerge. Many traditional 
moderators of TPP (source and message evaluation) produced main effects but not 
interaction effects. Ideology, fandom, humorousness, and social distance did produce 
interesting differences between the news condition and the political humor condition. 
 Adopting a strategy recommended by Aiken and West (1991), the primary 
strategy for analysis was to examine moderating variables and interactions utilizing 
linear regression. To execute this analysis properly, all the variables were centered to 
minimize collinearity (however, they were not standardized) (Aiken & West, 1991). 
Regressions were run using the independent variables and the interaction variable (a 
product of the two independent variables).   
When the interaction was significant, unstandardized regression coefficients 
were plotted, as suggested by Aiken and West (1991), using the unstandardized 
regression equation (plotted in figures 1, 3, and 4). These interactions were used to draw 
conclusions about the hypotheses. For humorousness (H3) and fandom (H6), a strategy 
suggested by Aiken and West (1991) was used to set low, medium, and high values for 
the moderating variable. The centered mean (M = 0) was set as medium; the low and 
high values were set as one standard deviation below the mean (low) and above the 
mean (high). A similar strategy was used to establish liberal to conservative values for 
ideology (H5). 
This analysis strategy was used to examine source credibility (H1), message 
quality (H2), humorousness (H3), likelihood of exposure (H5), fandom (H6), ideology 
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(H7), bias (H8), and negative impact (H9). For the remaining research questions (RQ1) 
and hypotheses (H4, H9), the analysis strategy is explained below.   
 Participant data was removed from the final data set if the duration of the time it 
took to complete the survey was too short or too long. The average time to complete the 
survey was 27 minutes. People who did not take at least 17 minutes to complete the 
survey suggests they did not fully watch the eleven-minute stimulus video. Respondents 
who took more than three times the average time (81 minutes) to complete the survey 
were removed because it suggests they started the survey, paused, and returned to later.  
 A two-question measure was also added to the survey to gauge whether the 
respondent viewed the entire video. The measure was in the form of a quiz about the 
video. The two questions asked the number of different hosts involved and the subject 
matter of the video (see survey in appendix). Participants who answered incorrectly 
were removed from the data because it suggests they did not view the video. Incomplete 
surveys (i.e. the survey questionnaire was never fully completed) were also removed. 
The data set was then checked for normality and missing data was defined. 
 A manipulation check was performed on the stimulus materials (the humor and 
news videos). An independent-samples t-test found a significant difference between 
humor (M = 5.28, SD = 1.19) and news (M = 2.81, SD = 1.11) in terms of 
humorousness, t (340) = -19.86, d = 2.15, p < .001. As planned, the humor condition 
was considered more humorous than the news condition. 
Hypothesis one predicted that source credibility will moderate the relationship 
between message type (political humor vs. news) and TPP such that as credibility 
increases TPP will decrease, but the decrease will be greater for political humor than 
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news.  
The overall equation was significant, R2 = .077, F (3, 338) = 9.41, p ≤ .001 (see 
Table 1). There is a significant main effect (B = -.299, β = -.264) for source credibility 
on TPP (p ≤ .001). The main effect for condition (B = .006, β = .002) was not 
significant (p = .963). However, in this case, there is no support for the interaction (B = 
-.026, β = -.017) between source credibility and condition (p = .83).  
The main effect of source credibility influencing TPP is supported by past 
research. In this study, as source credibility decreased, TPP increased (consistent with 
previous studies). However, the predicted interaction between source credibility and 




Regression Analysis for Source Credibility as Moderator 
Variable   B  SE  β  
Constant   1.19  .06   
Condition   .006  .12  .002 
Source Credibility  -.299  .09  -.264** 
Interaction   -.026  .12  -.017 
Note. Dependent variable is TPP. R2 = .077, F (3, 338) = 9.41, p ≤ .001. ** = p ≤ .001 
 
Hypothesis two predicted quality of message will moderate the relationship 
between message type (political humor vs. news) and TPP such that as the quality of 
message increases TPP will decrease, but the decrease will be greater for political 
humor than news.  
The overall equation was significant, R2 = .059, F (3, 337) = 7.06, p ≤ .001 (see 
Table 2). There is a significant main effect (B = -.241, β = -.242) for message quality on 
TPP (p ≤ .001). The main effect for condition (B = .067, β = .029) was not significant 
 66 
(p = .553). However, in this case, there is no support for the interaction (B = -.018, β = -
.009) between message quality and condition (p = .86). 
The main effect of message quality influencing TPP is supported by past 
research. In this study, as message quality decreased, TPP increased (which is 
consistent with previous studies). However, the predicted interaction between message 
quality and condition was not significant. So hypothesis two is not supported. 
Table 2 
 
Regression Analysis for Message Quality as Moderator 
Variable   B  SE  β  
Constant   1.19  .061    
Condition   .067  .121  .029 
Message Quality  -.241  .053  -.242** 
Interaction   -.018  .105  -.009 
Note. Dependent variable is TPP. R2 = .059, F (3, 337) = 7.06, p ≤ .001. ** = p ≤ .001 
 
Hypothesis three predicted that humorousness of message will moderate the 
relationship between message type (political humor vs. news) and TPP such that as 
perceived humorousness increases TPP will increase, but the increase will be greater for 
political humor than news. 
The overall equation was significant, R2 = .030, F (3, 338) = 3.498, p = .016 (see 
Table 3). There is a significant main effect (B = -.103, β = .151) for humorousness on 
TPP (p < .05). The main effect for condition (B = .298, β = .130) was not significant (p 
= .11). The predicted interaction (B = -.265, β = .132) between humorousness and 
condition was significant (p = .015). The interaction is graphed (see figure 1). 
As predicted, there is a significant difference between news and political humor 
TPP levels. However, the direction of TPP levels was opposite of that predicted, thus 




Regression Analysis for Humorousness as Moderator 
Variable   B  SE  β  
Constant   1.36  .091   
Condition   .298  .181  .130 
Humorous   -.103  .054  -.151* 
Interaction   -.265  .108  -.132*  
Note. Dependent variable is TPP. R2 = .030, F (3, 338) = 3.498, p = .016. * = p < .05 
 
The TPP levels for news as humorousness goes from to low to high remain 
relatively flat (though they do slope up slightly). For political humor, as humorousness 
increases, TPP decreases. 
 
  
Figure 1. Interaction between humorousness and condition  
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To further understand the interaction, a simple effects analysis was done using 
procedures outlined by Preacher and colleagues (2006). When humorousness (M = 0, 
SD = 1.69) was slightly below the mean (humorousness = -.22 and below), the 
difference between news and humor was significant at p < .05. When humorousness 
reached -.22 and below, the humor condition produced significantly more TPP 
compared to the news condition. On the other hand, news would not produce 
significantly greater levels of TPP until humorousness reached 6.87and above (more 
than four standard deviations above the mean). 
Research question one first asked if TPP is generated when a source is seen as 
less credible but humorous. It then asked if TPP is generated when a source is seen as 
not humorous but credible. The analysis was first run on the entire data set (including 
both humor and news conditions). An independent samples t-test was run to compare 
those in group 1 (who found the source less credible but humorous) and group 2 
(everyone else). Group one membership was determined by finding the mean for 
credibility and the mean for humorousness. Group one consists of people who fell just 
below the mean for credibility and above the mean for humorousness. There was a 
significant difference between group 1 (M = 1.55, SD = 1.15) and group 2 (M = 1.09, 
SD = 1.13), t (340) = -3.09, d = .41, p = .002. To understand this better, a follow-up 
independent samples t-test was run to determine whether news and political humor were 
significantly different for this group. For those who found the source less credible but 
humorous, there was a significant difference between news (M = .047, SD = .22) and 
political humor (M = .399, SD = .49), t (340) = -8.55, d = .99, p ≤ .001. 
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A second independent samples t-test was run to compare those in group 1 (who 
found the source less funny but more credible) and group 2 (everyone else). Group one 
membership was determined by finding the mean for credibility and the mean for 
humorousness. Group one consists of people who fell above the mean for credibility 
and below the mean for humorousness. There was a significant difference between 
group 1 (M = .98, SD = 1.13) and group 2 (M = 1.26, SD = 1.15), t (340) = 1.91, d = -
.25, p < .05. To understand this better, a follow-up independent samples t-test was run 
to determine whether news and political humor were significantly different for this 
group. For those who found the source less funny but more credible, there was a 
significant difference between news (M = .47, SD = .51) and political humor (M = .03, 
SD = .18), t (340) = 10.81, d = -1.28, p ≤ .001. 
To further examine this question, only humor condition cases were analyzed. An 
independent samples t-test was run to compare those in group 1 (who found the source 
less credible but humorous) and group 2 (everyone else). There was a significant 
difference between group 1 (M = 1.54, SD = 1.13) and group 2 (M = 1.01, SD = 1.06), t 
(171) = -3.119, d = .49, p = .002. A second independent samples t-test was run to 
compare those in group 1 (who found the source less funny but more credible) and 
group 2 (everyone else). There was not a significant difference between group 1 (M = 
1.00, SD = .89) and group 2 (M = 1.23, SD = 1.12), t (171) = .490, d = -.21, p = .63. 
This suggests, in the humor condition, those who found the source less credible but 
humorous were significantly different than everyone else. 
Next, only news condition cases were analyzed. An independent samples t-test 
was run to compare those in group 1 (who found the source less credible but humorous) 
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and group 2 (everyone else). There was not a significant difference between group 1 (M 
= 1.63, SD = 1.41) and group 2 (M = 1.14, SD = 1.18), t (167) = -1.121, d = .41, p = .26. 
A second independent samples t-test was run to compare those in group 1 (who found 
the source less funny but more credible) and group 2 (everyone else). The difference 
between group 1 (M = .99, SD = 1.15) and group 2 (M = 1.33, SD = 1.21) approached 
significance, t (167) = 1.861, d = -.29, p = .06. This suggests, in the news condition, that 
those found the source less funny but more credible had marginally significant 
differences compared to everyone else. 
Hypothesis four predicts that social distance will moderate the relationship 
between message type (political humor vs. news) and TPP such that as social distance 
increases TPP will increase, but the increase will be greater for political humor than 
news. A repeated-measures ANOVA was run comparing TPP perceived for the 
following groups: friends, other students at the university, and the more abstract other 
people aged 20 to 30 years of age for both conditions (political humor and news). This 
group of variables was chosen because it represents the average participants peer group 
at varying distances removed.  
The Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was significant (p ≤ .001), so sphericity 
cannot be assumed. Using Greenhouse-Geisser correction, the repeated-measures 
ANOVA was significant, F (3, 866) = 554.28, p ≤ .001, partial η2 = .621. A post-hoc 
test (with Bonferroni adjustment) shows that the means are significant for each distance 
measured (p ≤ .001). The means for political humor and news are plotted in Figure 2.  
Using Greenhouse-Geisser correction, the repeated-measures ANOVA for the 
interaction between condition and distance was significant, F (3, 866) = 4.819, p 
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=    .004, partial η2 = .014. The plot suggests that as groups become more distant from 
the individual, the greater the level of TPP. In the news condition, individual level of 
TPP (M = 2.07, SD = 1.04) was significantly different from others. As the others 
became more distant, TPP levels increased: TPP friends (M = 3.64, SD = 1.31), TPP 
other students (M = 4.29, SD = 1.32), and general public aged 20-30 (M = 4.39, SD = 
1.39). It was similar in the political humor condition. Individual level of TPP (M = 1.94, 
SD = .96) was significantly different from others. As the others became more distant, 
TPP levels increased: TPP friends (M = 3.84, SD = 1.49), TPP other students (M = 4.53, 
SD = 1.29), and general public aged 20-30 (M = 4.81, SD = 1.35). 
 
 
Figure 2. Repeated Measures of Social Distance and TPP 
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An independent-samples t-test was run to evaluate whether the difference 
between humor and news was significant. There was a significant difference between 
news (M = 4.39, SD = 1.398) and political humor (M = 4.81, SD = 1.348) in the most 
distant group (an abstract general public aged 20 to 30), t (339) = -2.809, p = .005. The 
difference between news (M = 4.29, SD = 1.32) and political humor (M = 4.53, SD = 
1.291) was approaching significance for the “other students” distance, t (339) = -1.733, 
p = .08. The difference between news and political humor was not significant for self, t 
(340) = 1.14, p = .25, and friends, t (340) = -1.352, p = .17. Overall, the results suggest 
that as social distance increases, TPP increases. Moreover, as social distance increases 
to the most distant group, there is significantly more TPP for political humor compared 
to news. Hypothesis four is partially supported. 
Hypothesis five predicted that perceived likelihood of exposure will moderate 
the relationship between message type (political humor vs. news) and TPP such that as 
perceived likelihood of exposure increases TPP will increase, but the increase will be 
greater for political humor than news. 
Regression analysis was used to examine the moderating effects of perceived 
likelihood of exposure on the relationship between condition (political humor and news) 
and TPP. Perceived likelihood of exposure was measured for friends, other students at 
the university, general public aged 20-30, and general public. 
The most distant group - the “general public” – was the only significant 
equation, R2 = .029, F (3, 338) = 3.35, p = .019 (see Table 4). There was a significant 
main effect (B = .133, β = .152) for likelihood of exposure on TPP (p = .006). There 
was not a significant main effect (B = -.017, β = -.008) for condition on TPP (p = .89). 
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The predicted interaction (B = -.123, β = -.069) was not significant (p = .21). This 
suggests that the more likely they perceive someone in the general public to watch 
either media source, the higher the TPP level. However, the interaction was not 
significant, so there appears to be no significant difference between political humor and 
news. 
For the likelihood that “other student at the university” would be exposed, the 
overall equation approached significance with R2 = .022, F (3, 338) = 2.49, p = .06. 
There was a significant main effect (B = .104, β = .133) for likelihood of exposure on 
TPP (p = .023). Therefore, as likelihood of exposure increased, TPP increased. 
However, the interaction (B = -.09, β = -.054) was not significant (p = .32), so there 
appears to be no significant difference between the two genres. The main effect for 
condition (B = -.049, β = -.022) was also not significant (p = .71) 
Table 4 
 
Regression Analysis for Likelihood of Exposure (General Public) as Moderator 
Variable   B  SE  β  
Constant   1.21  .063    
Condition   -.017  .126  -.008 
Likelihood Exposure  .133  .048  .152* 
Interaction   -.123  .096  -.069 
Note. Dependent variable is TPP. R2 = .029, F (3, 338) = 3.35, p = .019. * = p ≤ .05 
 
For the likelihood that “friends” would be exposed to the video, the overall 
equation was not significant, R2 = .003, F (3, 338) = .299, p = .83. For the likelihood 
that “general public aged 20-30” would be exposed to the video, the overall equation 
was not significant, R2 = .018, F (3, 337) = 2.06, p = .11. Overall, this hypothesis is not 
supported. 
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Hypothesis six predicted fan identification moderates the relationship between 
message type (political humor vs. news) and TPP such that as political humor 
appreciation decreases, TPP will increase, but the increase will be greater for political 
humor than news. 
The overall equation was significant, R2 = .035, F (3, 338) = 4.03, p = .008 (see 
Table 5). There is a significant main effect (B = -.098, β = -.106) for fan of humor on 
TPP (p < .05). The main effect for condition (B = .067, β = .029) was not significant (p 
= .59). The predicted interaction (B = -.264, β = -.142) between fan of humor and 
condition was significant (p = .008).  See Figure 3 for the interaction graph. 
As predicted, less fandom of political humor coincided with higher TPP levels. 
As fandom increased, TPP levels decreased in the political humor condition. In the 
news condition, the line stayed fairly level; though there appears to be slight link 
between higher fandom coinciding with higher TPP levels in the news condition. 
However, the fluctuation in TPP levels is greater in the political humor condition, thus 
this hypothesis is supported. 
Table 5 
 
Regression Analysis for Fan of Humor as Moderator 
Variable   B  SE  β  
Constant   1.21  .06   
Condition   .067  .123  .029 
Fan of Humor   -.098  .05  -.106* 
Interaction   -.264  .099  -.142*  
Note. Dependent variable is TPP. R2 = .035, F (3, 338) = 4.03, p = .008. * = p < .05 
 
To further understand the interaction between fandom and condition, a simple 
effects analysis was done using procedures outlined by Preacher and colleagues (2006). 
The humor condition produced significantly more TPP compared to news (p < .05) 
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when fan of humor reached -0.86 below the mean and lower (M = 0, SD = 1.25). News 
produced significantly greater levels of TPP compared humor (p < .05) when fan of 
humor reached 2.01 above the mean (i.e., 1.6 SD above the mean) and higher. 
 
Figure 3. Interaction of fan of humor and condition. 
Hypothesis seven predicted political ideology moderates the relationship 
between message type (political humor vs. news) and TPP such that as conservatism 
increases, TPP will increase, but the increase will be greater for political humor than 
news. 
The overall equation was significant, R2 = .047, F (3, 338) = 5.534, p ≤ .001 (see 
Table 6). There was not a significant main effect (B = .054, β = .075) for political 
ideology on TPP (p = .158). The main effect for condition (B = .056, β = .024) was not 
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significant (p = .646). The predicted interaction (B = .281, β = .197) between political 
ideology and condition was significant (p ≤ .001).  
Table 6 
 
Regression Analysis for Political Ideology as Moderator 
Variable   B  SE  β  
Constant   1.19  .061 
Condition   .056  .122  .024 
Political Ideology  .054  .038  .075 
Interaction   .281  .076  .197** 
Note. Dependent variable is TPP. R2 = .047, F (3, 338) = 5.534, p ≤ .001. ** = p ≤ .001 
 
 
Figure 4. Interaction of ideology and condition 
The interaction (see figure 4) shows conservative participants had higher levels 
of TPP compared to liberal participants in the humor condition. For the news condition, 
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liberals had a higher level of TPP compared to conservatives. This hypothesis was 
partially supported.  
To further understand the interaction between ideology and condition, a simple 
effects analysis was done using procedures outlined by Preacher and colleagues (2006). 
The news condition produced significantly more TPP compared to humor (p < .05) 
when ideology reached -1.30 below the mean and lower (M = 0, SD = 1.61). Political 
humor produced significantly greater levels of TPP compared news (p < .05) when 
ideology reached 0.74 above the mean and higher. 
Hypothesis eight predicted source bias moderates the relationship between 
message type (political humor vs. news) and TPP such that as perception of bias 
increases, TPP will increase, but the increase will be greater for political humor than 
news.  
The overall equation was significant, R2 = .037, F (3, 338) = 4.36, p = .005 (see 
Table 7). There is a significant main effect (B = .216, β = .185) for perceived bias on 
TPP (p ≤ .001). The main effect for condition (B = -.046, β = -.02) was not significant 
(p = .715). However, in this case, there is no support for the interaction (B = -.094, β = -
.039) between perceived bias and condition (p = .47). 
The main effect of perceived bias influencing TPP is supported by past research. 
In this study, as perceived bias increased, TPP. However, the predicted interaction 









Regression Analysis for Perceived Bias as Moderator 
Variable   B  SE  β  
Constant   1.204  .063 
Condition   -.046  .126  -.02 
Perceived Bias  .216  .065  .185** 
Interaction   -.094  .130  -.039 
Note. Dependent variable is TPP. R2 = .037, F (3, 338) = 4.36, p = .005. ** = p ≤ .001 
 
Hypothesis nine predicted perceived negative impact moderates the relationship 
between message type (political humor vs. news) and TPP such that as perceived 
negative impact increases, TPP will increase, but the increase will be greater for news 
than for political humor. 
The overall equation was significant, R2 = .050, F (3, 338) = 5.97, p ≤ .001 (see 
Table 8). There is a significant main effect (B = .242, β = .224) for negative impact on 
TPP (p ≤ .001). The main effect for condition (B = .105, β = .046) was not significant 
(p = .393). However, in this case, there is no support for the interaction between 
negative impact and condition (p = .586). 
In this study, as the main effect for perceived negative impact increased, TPP 
increased. However, the predicted interaction between perceived negative impact and 
condition was not significant. So hypothesis eight is not supported. 
Table 8 
 
Regression Analysis for Negative Impact as Moderator 
Variable   B  SE  β  
Constant   1.19  .061     
Condition   .105  .122  .046 
Negative Impact  .242  .058  .224** 
Interaction   -.063  .116  -.029 
Note. Dependent variable is TPP. R2 = .050, F (3, 338) = 5.97, p ≤ .001. ** = p ≤ .001 
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Hypothesis ten predicted TPP levels would moderate the relationship between 
message type (political humor vs. news) and behavior such that as TPP increases, 
behavior will increase, but the increase will be greater for political humor than news. 
The overall equation was significant, R2 = .047, F (3, 338) = 5.49, p ≤ .001 (see 
Table 9). There is a significant main effect (B = -.201, β = -.195) for TPP level on 
behavior (p ≤ .001). The main effect for condition (B = .227, β = .096) approached 
significance (p = .07). However, in this case, there is no support for the interaction (B = 
-.065, β = -.031) between TPP and condition (p = .56). 
The main effect of TPP influencing behavior is supported by past research 
suggesting that presumed influence of the media can lead to behavioral adjustment. In 
this study, as TPP increased, behavior decreased. However, the predicted interaction 
between TPP and condition (political humor or news) was not significant. So hypothesis 
ten is not supported. 
Table 9 
 
Regression Analysis for Condition as moderator 
Variable   B  SE  β  
Constant   3.58  .063 
Condition   .227  .126  .096 
TPP    -.201  .055  -.195** 
Interaction   -.065  .110  -.031 
 










 The goal of this project was to further examine political humor shows as a form 
of political news. The results suggest the comparison between political humor and news 
is complex and not always clear cut. Results suggest TPP persist regardless of the media 
consumed. The differences between news and political humor are not as parsimonious.  
In summary, the moderating effects of source credibility (H1), message quality 
(H2), likelihood of exposure (H5), bias (H8), and negative impact (H9) were not 
significantly different for the two conditions (humor and news). Research question one, 
which inquired about the balance of credibility and humor, produced mixed results. On 
the contrary, the moderating effects of humorousness (H3), social distance (H4), fan of 
humor (H6), and ideology (H7) did result in significant differences between the 
conditions. TPP’s influence on behavior (H10) resulted in a main effect only. 
Multiple themes emerged in this study. First, there was little distinction between 
political humor and news for traditional TPP predictors like source credibility, message 
quality, negative impact of message, perceived bias, and likelihood of exposure. These 
factors resulted in significant main effects, suggesting the experiment was valid in its 
design because these main effects replicate past research. However, the predicted 
interactions were not significant, suggesting in terms of factors like message quality and 
source credibility, there was not significant difference between political humor and 
news.  
A second theme to emerge was the factor of social identity. When group 
identification was examined (specifically ideology, social distance, and fandom), there 
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were differences in TPP levels for political humor and news. Therefore, when group 
segmentation was considered (liberal and conservative, fan and non-fan), levels of TPP 
were significantly different for news and political humor, and predicted interactions 
were supported. 
 A third theme focuses on the behavioral component of TPP. Results were mixed 
when presumed influence was factored into behavior modification. Arguably, this is the 
area for further exploration and research. 
Each of these themes is discussed in this chapter. Results for each hypothesis 
and research question are considered in relation to the overall themes and in relation to 
each other. Overall, contributions to theory are discussed for the project as a whole. 
Limitations of the project will also be discussed, along with suggestions for future 
research in TPP and political humor. 
Message & Source 
The first theme to emerge from the analysis was a persistent support for the 
motivational explanation of TPP without a marked difference between political humor 
and news. Very traditional predictors of TPP (from past research), including source 
credibility, message quality, and message valence, were found to influence TPP levels 
for both political news and humor. However, there was not a significant difference 
between news and political humor for these moderators. (The one exception to this was 
perceived humorousness, which did result in a significant difference between news and 
political humor.) This suggests while TPP exists for both political humor and news, 
there appears to be little distinction between those media genres when considering 
source and message. This discussion focuses on these two aspects: source 
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characteristics (in terms of credibility and bias) and message characteristics (in terms of 
quality and valence).  
Source characteristics were a sub-theme in the study. Source characteristics 
were examined in terms of source credibility (H1, RQ1) and source bias (H8). 
Hypothesis one predicted that source credibility would moderate the relationship 
between message type (political humor vs. news) and TPP such that as credibility 
increases TPP will decrease, but the decrease will be greater for political humor than for 
news. The rationale for hypothesis one argued that for both political humor and news, 
when the source was perceived as more credible, TPP would be lower compared to 
when the source is perceived as less credible. The logic for this rationale is high source 
credibility correlates with higher first-person perception (Duck, Terry, & Hogg, 1995). 
This trend did persist with both political humor and news, with a significant main effect 
for source credibility on the level of TPP. Results show, for the main effect, as source 
credibility increased, TPP decreased.   
Arguably, the influence of source credibility should be magnified for political 
humor given its overall perceived lack of traditional news credibility (compared to 
traditional news). Therefore, when political humor is considered credible, it should be 
considered more credible than news because of the humor affiliation (fandom) factor. 
When political humor is considered non-credible, it should be a greater level of non-
credibility compared to traditional news given its “fake” news status. Given this logic, 
these fluctuations should have been reflected in significantly different TPP levels. 
However, hypothesis one is not supported in this project because the interaction 
between source credibility and condition was not significant.  
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Even though both media types (political humor and news) created TPP when 
source credibility was low, there was not a significant difference between the two media 
genres. This is at once surprising and not surprising at all. The rationale for predicting 
that third person and first person levels for political humor would fluctuate on a wider 
spectrum than first and third person levels for news was based on the nature of humor. 
Political humor is highly affiliative, so some people understand the humor (and are in 
on the joke) and some people do not. It was argued that a person who understands the 
humor would also perceive the source to have high credibility. The results, however, 
show that there were no differences in the conditions in terms of evaluating source 
credibility. 
To further examine humorousness and credibility, research question one first 
asked if TPP is generated when a source is seen as less credible but humorous. Research 
question one then asked if TPP is generated when a source is seen as less humorous but 
more credible. The motivation for this question was to illuminate the interplay of humor 
and credibility. Much of the research on political humor argues that while the shows are 
funny and popular, they are still “fake” news and are separate and distinct from 
traditional news sources (Baum & Jamison, 2006; Bennett, 2007; Peterson, 2008). The 
goal of research question one was to further examine the dynamic of credibility and 
humor. 
In terms of TPP research and political humor, the impact of humor and 
credibility on TPP levels is unclear. On the one hand, arguably, messages seen as funny 
could possibly lower TPP level; however, messages intended to be funny but seen as 
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rude or offensive could elevate TPP levels. Moreover, it is arguable high credibility can 
override humor or diffuse an unfunny message. 
The results of this study suggest the mix of credibility and humor remains 
unclear. There were significant differences between people who found the source to be 
highly credible but less funny compared to everyone else in terms of TPP level. 
However, upon further investigation it appears participants in the news condition were 
driving this result. This group produced nearly significant differences for the news 
condition, but non-significant results for the humor condition.  
On the contrary, those who perceived the source to be less credible and more 
humorous produced significantly different levels of TPP compared to everyone else. 
Upon further investigation, this group was significant for the humor condition, but not 
significant for the news condition. Overall, the results of research question one arguably 
reflect the results of hypothesis one (source credibility) and hypothesis three 
(humorousness). Source credibility was non-significant as moderator between condition 
and TPP in hypothesis one. Humorousness was a significant moderator for hypothesis 
three, but the TPP fluctuations are primarily for the humor condition.  
Hypothesis eight predicted source bias moderates the relationship between 
message type (political humor vs. news) and TPP such that as perception of bias 
increases, TPP will increase, but the increase will be greater for political humor than 
news. Even though bias is often studied in terms of ideological identification, source 
bias in this study was operationalized as an evaluation of the source. The rationale for 
this hypothesis argued that a message perceived as biased would generate greater levels 
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of TPP. This trend was true for this study as well. There was significant main effect for 
bias on TPP, whereby as bias increases, TPP increased as well.  
The hypothesis predicted that this trend would be greater for political humor 
compared to news. Given the over-the-top nature of political humor and its affiliative 
nature, it was argued the spectrum of TPP levels would be greater for political humor 
than for news. The hypothesis predicting an interaction between bias and condition was 
not supported. The results showed no significant difference in the way participants 
interpreted bias levels in the news condition and bias levels in political humor 
condition.  
This may partially be a function of the research design, which used liberal 
leaning news and liberal leaning political humor stimuli. However, these results are 
similar to other trends in message and source evaluation. In terms of source bias, there 
were no differences in news and political humor. They were seen as comparable in 
terms of TPP levels. It is intriguing that political news and humor does not produce 
significant TPP differences in the conditions for perceptions of bias even though there is 
a significant difference in the conditions (i.e., interaction) when considering ideological 
identification (H7). This is interesting because even though there were no significant 
differences in the conditions in terms of message evaluation (perceptions of bias), there 
were significant differences in terms of group identification (ideological identification). 
Social identification is further explored in the next section of this chapter. 
Message characteristics were also a sub-theme in the study. Message 
characteristics were examined in terms of message quality (H2) and message valence 
(H3 and H9). Quality of message functioned in a similar fashion as source credibility. 
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Hypothesis two predicted quality of message would moderate the relationship between 
message type (political humor vs. news) and TPP such that as the quality of message 
increases TPP will decrease, but the decrease will be greater for political humor than 
news. The rationale for this prediction was similar to hypothesis one. It was argued, 
because of the affiliative nature of political humor, those who found the humor to be 
funny would also find it to be a high quality. Therefore, like hypothesis one, it was 
predicted the TPP and FPP spectrum would be wider for political humor than for news. 
For humor, it was predicted a high-quality message would produce greater FPP levels 
(compared to news); conversely, a low quality message was predicted to generate 
higher TPP levels (compared to news). 
Like source credibility, message quality did impact level of TPP and FPP for 
both genres. There was a significant main effect for message quality in the regression 
equation. As message quality decreased, TPP levels increased; as message quality 
increased, TPP levels decreased (and FPP levels increased). However, the interaction 
between message quality and condition was not significant. Again, for both media 
types, poorer message quality generated greater TPP levels, but there was not a 
significant difference between the genres. This is contrary to the notion that people 
perceive political humor and news to be rather different. Perhaps this adds further 
evidence to the argument, at least in terms of message quality, there is little distinction 
between political humor and news in terms of producing TPP.  
 This project also examined message valence (humorousness and negative 
impact) and TPP levels. Hypothesis three predicted that humorousness of message 
would moderate the relationship between message type (political humor vs. news) and 
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TPP such that as perceived humorousness increases TPP will increase, but the increase 
will be greater for political humor than news. Though contrary to the assumption that 
things that are funny are positively valenced, it has been argued throughout this study 
political humor is classified as an aggressive and disparaging form of humor. 
Disparaging humor often has a negative valence even if it is considered funny. Negative 
messages correlate with higher TPP levels. Moreover, political humor is also affiliative 
– us versus them – so it is naturally set up for an individual to make a TPP appraisal of 
the “others”.  
Hypothesis three was not supported. Although the interaction of humorousness 
and condition was significant, it was not in the predicted direction. Though not 
predicted, there was also a significant main effect for humorousness. As humorousness 
increases, TPP levels decrease in the humor condition. The results show TPP levels 
remain fairly flat in the news condition with a minor slope down; as humorousness 
increases, TPP decreases. The news condition did not produce significant differences 
between low and high humorousness.  
Interestingly, the TPP fluctuations appear to be mainly in the humor condition. It 
appears those who found the humor video funny also perceived lower levels of TPP. A 
simple effects analysis shows TPP levels become significantly different between humor 
and news just below the mean (i.e., more TPP in the humor condition), but only become 
significant for news (i.e., more TPP for the news group than the humor) more than four 
standard deviations above the mean. This suggests humorousness of message is more 
important in the humor condition (which makes sense for a humor-based show). 
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That humorousness is primarily a factor in the humor condition is not 
necessarily surprising. News is not intended to be funny and likely would not be 
perceived as such. What is interesting is humorousness did not result in higher TPP 
levels, as was predicted in highly affiliative and disparaging humor. In this study, the 
opposite was the case. Message desirability is a possible explanation, suggesting for the 
humor condition, a higher level of perceived humor would equate to a higher level of 
message quality. As message quality increases, TPP levels tend to decrease. 
Hypothesis nine predicted perceived negative impact moderates the relationship 
between message type (political humor vs. news) and TPP such that as perceived 
negative impact increases, TPP will increase, but the increase will be greater for news 
than for political humor. Despite being examined in the context of TPP and censorship, 
negative impact appears to be more aligned with message evaluation than behavioral 
action (in terms of the operationalization of this study). The rationale for the prediction 
is negativity of a message should correlate with higher TPP levels. The affiliative and 
disparagement nature of political humor should create a greater fluctuation in 
perceptions of negativity and thus a wider spectrum of TPP levels. What is interesting is 
perceived impact of the message does not have the same effect as humorousness. 
Results show that despite a main effect for perceived negativity, the interaction between 
negativity and condition was not significant.  
Social Identity 
The second major theme to emerge in this study was the influence of social 
identity as a significant moderator in the perceptions of political news and humor. This 
was the case for group identification, with significant results for fan identification and 
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ideological identification. It was also present in distinguishing group identity (in terms 
of social distance). Likelihood of exposure (whether other groups would watch the 
program) had mixed results. 
Hypothesis six predicted fan identification would moderate the relationship 
between message type (political humor vs. news) and TPP such that as political humor 
appreciation decreases, TPP will increase, but the increase will be greater for political 
humor than news. The rationale for this prediction is fans of political humor should 
judge other people more incapable of judging the humor compared than themselves. 
This argument is again based on the affiliative nature of political humor. The result 
should be a spectrum of TPP levels that fluctuate more than TPP levels for news. 
Moreover, news would likely not be affected by this same type of fandom, so news TPP 
levels should fluctuate less.  
Results from this study show, indeed, fandom is a significant moderator of TPP 
with clear difference in the political humor and news conditions. However, the direction 
of the results were opposite of what was predicted. There was a significant main effect – 
as fan levels increased, TPP levels decreased. The interaction also revealed, in the 
political humor condition, as fan appreciation of the genre increased, TPP actually 
decreased. This suggests as fan appreciation of the shows increased, there was likely an 
increase in FPP.  
A simple-effects analysis shows TPP levels become significant for humor a half 
a standard deviation below the mean, suggesting medium to low levels of humor 
appreciation correlate to significant TPP levels. The analysis shows TPP levels become 
significant in the news condition at one and half times the standard deviation above the 
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mean. This suggests only to most high-level fans of humor had significant levels of TPP 
for the news condition. 
Participants in the news condition who were identified as fan of political humor 
had a significantly different TPP level than counterparts in the political humor 
condition. As fan appreciation of political humor increased, TPP increased (though at a 
very slight level). It is not clear why the news condition produced TPP levels in the 
predicted direction while the political humor condition produced TPP levels opposite of 
the predicted direction. Perhaps fans of political humor consider other people to be less 
savvy about political news (thus producing higher TPP levels), but are themselves such 
strong fans of political humor shows that they had greater levels of perceived self-
influence. 
Ideology is another group identification that produced a significant difference 
between political humor and news. Hypothesis seven predicted political ideology 
moderates the relationship between message type (political humor vs. news) and TPP 
such that as conservativeness increases, TPP will increase, but the increase will be 
greater for political humor than news. The rationale for this prediction was based on 
past research that shows conservatives tend to have higher TPP levels compared to 
liberals. This is particularly true when they trying to defend their position and are afraid 
others will be persuaded. 
Results for this study showed neither condition nor ideology produced a 
significant main effect. However, there was a significant interaction between ideology 
and condition. In the political humor condition, as predicted, more liberal participants 
had lower TPP levels. As participants progressed on the spectrum toward conservative, 
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TPP levels increased. Interestingly, TPP levels were opposite in the news condition. For 
those in the news condition, higher conservatism correlated with lower TPP levels 
compared to higher liberalism.  
A simple-effects analysis shows that moderately conservative people (one half 
standard deviation above the mean) had significantly higher TPP levels for the humor. 
For the news condition, TPP levels became significant nearly one standard deviation 
below the mean. This suggests even moderately conservative had higher TPP levels for 
political humor, while only the most liberal people had significant TPP levels for news.  
Given that both the news and political humor conditions were made up of 
programming with a more liberal slant (MSNBC, The Daily Show, Colbert Report, Real 
Time with Bill Maher), the results suggest it is a difference in the genre more than the 
content that is producing the significant differences. Perhaps conservatives find political 
humor to be more persuasive (thus producing higher TPP levels) than the news. 
 Comparison of self to other reference groups also produced interesting results. 
Hypothesis four predicted that social distance would moderate the relationship between 
message type (political humor vs. news) and TPP such that as social distance increases 
TPP will increase, but the increase will be greater for political humor than news. Past 
research supports the trend that as social distance increases TPP also increases. This 
trend was also present for the reference groups of friends, other student at the 
university, and general public (aged 20-30). The purpose of the analysis was to examine 
how young people view other people in their immediate reference groups. As predicted, 
as social distance increased, TPP increased.  
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The hypothesis predicted a significant difference in political humor and news. 
For the most immediate reference groups (Friends and other student at the university), 
the difference between the two conditions was not significant. However, perceptions of 
the most vague and distant group (general public aged 20-30) were significantly 
different for the two conditions. So, the more distant and vague the “other” became, 
there was significantly greater levels of TPP for the political humor condition compared 
to the news condition. Again, pinpointing the reason for this difference is unclear, but 
perhaps there is a difference in perceived persuasiveness between the genres. 
 In addition to social distance, this study also looked at perceived likelihood of 
exposure as a moderator of TPP levels. Hypothesis five predicted that perceived 
likelihood of exposure would moderate the relationship between message type (political 
humor vs. news) and TPP such that as perceived likelihood of exposure increases TPP 
will increase, but the increase will be greater for political humor than news. The 
rationale for this prediction is based in TPP research suggests TPP levels are linked with 
perceived likelihood of exposure. If people perceive others to be likely to watch the 
program, TPP levels should increase. Levels between political humor and news should 
be different because different target audiences are known to watch each genre.  
 This hypothesis, overall, was not supported. Only likelihood that “general 
public” would watch either of the genres had a significant main effect. However, the 
interaction between “general public” and condition was not significant. There was non-
significance for the other groups as well. This suggests participants were not 




The potential for TPP to influence behavior change is the area for the most 
potential future research. The results for this project’s foray into the influence of 
presumed influence are mixed.  
Hypothesis ten predicted TPP levels would moderate the relationship between 
message type (political humor vs. news) and behavior such that as TPP increases, 
behavior will increase, but the increase will be greater for political humor than news. 
The rationale for this prediction is based on literature supporting a link between 
perceived influence (TPP) and behavior modification (Gunther & Storey, 2003). It was 
also based on the perceived bandwagon effect of popular hosts, like Jon Stewart, that 
may inspire people to act based on the presumed influence of that host. The results, to 
the contrary, demonstrate the link between TPP and behavior is still unclear. This is not 
completely surprising, given the research on presumed influence is still rather 
inconclusive, particular in terms of media predicting political behavior. Banning (2006) 
found evidence of presumed influence, but it was opposite of the predicted direction. 
For this study, the behaviors of interest pertained to further consumption of 
political humor and news, as well as the continued circulation of political humor or 
news texts. Participants were asked about their likelihood to post the video clip to their 
Facebook page, forward the clip to a friend, tweet about the content on Twitter, and 
consume more of the shows (either on television or online). Interestingly, there was a 
main effect for TPP on the dependent variable behavior. Results show as TPP 
decreases, behavior increases, which suggests a possible link between FPP and 
increased behavior. In other words, as self-influence increases (either by thinking the 
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content was funny or persuasive for the self), behavior appears to increase in terms of 
viewing more of the content and circulating the content further. 
It was predicted this behavior would be greater for humor than for news. The 
rationale for this prediction is humor would be seen as more likely to have a popular 
following and greater presumed influence. However, this interaction hypothesis was not 
supported. There is no significant difference between the humor and news conditions in 
terms of TPP influencing behavior. It appears the source of the media (be it humor or 
news) is not a major factor in presumed influence and behavior modification. 
Theoretical Contribution 
There were a number of theoretical contributions to both the literature on TPP 
and the literature on political humor. First, in terms of TPP, this study points to a 
difference in message attributes and social identity. This project shows trends for a 
distinct difference in social identity driven reactions to media and message evaluation 
reactions to media. The results of this study suggest group identification (be it 
ideological, fandom, or social network) dictates TPP levels more than message 
evaluation (credibility, quality, bias, exposure, and negative impact). Understanding the 
influence of social identity on TPP could potentially make research on the influence of 
presumed influence clearer by illuminating how and why people are judging other 
reference groups. 
Second, this study adds important empirical data to the literature on political 
humor (especially in comparison to news). The results of this study suggest social 
identity is a bigger driving factor than message characteristics in terms of TPP (and 
arguably in terms of the perceived impact of the media as a whole). Perhaps it is not so 
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much the message or source attributions that are important. Arguably, the 
humorousness or the so-called lack of credibility on the part of Jon Stewart, Stephen 
Colbert, or Bill Maher are not the most important factors in audience appraisal of the 
overall effect of this genre. Results of this study suggest political humor is taken quite 
seriously and is as credible as traditional news in terms of perceived effects on others. 
This study should help future research on the political humor by focusing attention on 
the groups who use political humor (social identity) as opposed to why political humor 
is “fake news” (message evaluation). 
Limitations & Future Research 
Trying to replicate a media artifact outside of its natural environment is always 
difficult. Steps were taken to control for host popularity (by including three different 
shows) and ideological focus (MSNBC was chosen to match the liberal leaning of the 
political humor clips). At some point, a research design must balance the desire for 
internal validity and external validity. Therefore, the design of this project was deemed 
to be the most viable option given the time and resources available. (Indeed, numerous 
main effect significant results indicate the design was replicating past research and was 
therefore a viable design). There are limitations in any design, however, and those 
limitations should be taken into consideration. Future research should continue with 
empirical examinations of political humor in a multitude of research designs and 
settings. 
Some of the operationalizations for this study, particularly in terms of presumed 
influence, need refinement. Judging behavior modification is always challenging and 
this study did a fair job of a preliminary evaluation of behavior modification. Future 
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research should evaluate different types of behavior more clearly and integrate the 
influence of both TPP and social identity on behavior modification. 
Conclusion 
 From the outset, it was argued political humor should not be discounted as a 
legitimate and influential news source. The existing evidence to support this claim is 
inconclusive and, arguably, in fluctuation. The goal of this project, then, was to examine 
political humor from a media effects perspective to provide further understanding of 
political humor as a form of news. 
It was asked at the beginning: Are Stewart and Colbert considered legitimate 
sources? Do people find them threatening? How do the hosts inspire social 
identification? Do they have a high level of presumed influence given their celebrity 
status? 
 The results of this study suggest a number of trends. First, this study suggests 
political humor shows are indeed seen as legitimate news sources. In terms of multiple 
factors (including source credibility, message quality, and bias), there were no 
significant differences between humor and news. Second, political humor shows were 
not necessarily seen as threatening (in terms of negative impact) and were actually 
found to inspire higher perceived effects on the self (in terms of fan appreciation).  
Third, social identity is key to the differences in political humor and news. 
Significant differences between the two conditions were moderated by fandom, 
ideology, and social distance. This suggests political humor is an important news source 
for certain groups within society (a trend that is supported by past research). Those with 
lower TPP levels in the humor condition tend to be more liberal and highly appreciate 
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political humor. Those same people arguably evaluate other people as distant out-
groups or those that do not understand the humor. Fourth, the presumed influence of 
political humor is unclear as it was not significantly different from news. Results 
suggest higher FPP levels lead to greater behavioral modification, but this is not 
distinguished between the two conditions. 
This project also adds to the TPP literature. Results suggest social identity and 
evaluating the media’s influence on reference groups is important in terms of 
distinguishing between different genres. This project also adds evidence in support of 
TPP influencing behavior modification. 
In sum, this project finds support for continued research in both political humor 
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How many show segments were edited together in the video? 
One show 
Two different shows 





After viewing this clip, what emotions do you feel about the clip? 
Funny  1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Unfunny 
Offensive 1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Not Offensive 
Boring  1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Not Boring 
Confusing 1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Not Confusing 
Biased  1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Unbiased 
Hilarious         1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Not hilarious 
Amusing 1     2     3     4     5     6     7     Un-amusing 












After viewing this clip, what do you think about the source of the clip? 
Wrong   1     2     3     4     5     6     7      Right  
Negative  1     2     3     4     5     6     7      Positive  
Unfavorable  1     2     3     4     5     6     7      Favorable 
Unacceptable   1     2     3     4     5     6     7      Acceptable  
Foolish   1     2     3     4     5     6     7      Wise 
Bad    1     2     3     4     5     6     7      Good 
Not intelligent  1     2     3     4     5     6     7      Intelligent 
Unreliable  1     2     3     4     5     6     7      Reliability  
Untrustworthiness 1     2     3     4     5     6     7              Trustworthiness 
Unqualified  1     2     3     4     5     6     7      Qualified  
Not credible  1     2     3     4     5     6     7      Credible  
Immoral  1     2     3     4     5     6     7      Moral  
Not self-centered 1     2     3     4     5     6     7      Self-centered  
Incompetent  1     2     3     4     5     6     7      Competent  
Unethical  1     2     3     4     5     6     7      Ethical  
Unfair   1     2     3     4     5     6     7      Fair 





Please rate how you perceive the intentions of the clip source.  
1 = strongly disagree, 4 = neutral, 7 = strongly agree  
 
Does this clip make the subject of the story more likeable? 
 
Do you think the source of the clip is biased? 
 
Do you think the source of this clip tends to be more politically conservative? 
 
Do you think the source of this clip tends to be more politically liberal? 
 
Do you think the source of this clip is trying to change your mind? 
 
Do you think the source of the clip is opposed to the attitude of the  












Please rate the clip you just watched.  
1 = strongly agree, 4 = neutral, 7 = strongly disagree. 
 
It was logical. 
 
It made sense to me.  
 
The content was clear. 
 
The content was factual 
 





Please rate the clip you just viewed.  
1 = very little, 4 = neutral, 7 = very much. 
 
This video will impact my attitudes. 
 
This video will impact attitudes of others.  
 
 
Social Distance  
 
Please rate how the clip you just watched will affect other people.  
1 = not very much, 4 = neutral, 7 = a great deal 
 
This clip will impact attitudes of my friends. 
 
This clip will impact attitudes of other students. 
 











Likelihood of Exposure 
 
Please rate the likelihood that other groups of people will view this  
show/news source.  
1 = not very likely, 4 = neutral, 7 = very likely 
 
What is the likelihood that your friends will be exposed to this show? 
 
What is the likelihood that other students at this university will be  
exposed to this show? 
 
What is the likelihood that other people aged 20-30 will be  
exposed to this show? 
 





Please rate how negative you rate the clip you just watched.  
1 = not much at all, 4 = neutral, 7 = a great deal 
 
The content presented will negatively impact my own attitudes. 
 
The content presented will negatively impact the attitudes of  
other students. 
 
The content presented will negatively impact the attitudes of  
other people my age. 
 
The content presented will negatively impact the attitudes of  
















Fan of Humor 
Think about political humor shows you may view (like The Daily Show with  
Jon Stewart or The Colbert Report).  
Based on those shows, please answer the following questions.  
1= strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree. 
 
I appreciate political humor because it reveals the weaknesses of our political  
leaders & institutions. 
 
I appreciate political humor because it can make me feel more knowledgeable  
about politics. 
 
I appreciate political humor because it can aid me in reinforcing my political  
beliefs. 
 
I appreciate political humor when it makes me aware that our political system is 
dysfunctional. 
 
I appreciate political humor because it can help me express my political opinions. 
 
I appreciate political humor because it can reduce the anxiety I feel toward  
politics. 
 
I appreciate political humor when it helps me make better sense of why our  
political system is dysfunctional. 
 
I appreciate political humor because I feel like I understand the jokes, but other  
people don’t understand the jokes. 
 
I appreciate political humor because it can help me effectively criticize politics  
and politicians. 
 
I appreciate political humor because it allows me to be friendly with people who  
hold political views that are different than my own. 
 
I appreciate political humor because it allows me to form stronger bonds with  
people who hold similar political views as my own. 
I appreciate political humor because it critiques traditional news media. 
I appreciate political humor because it shows that traditional news media is 
dysfunctional. 
I appreciate political humor because it makes fun of traditional news media. 
I appreciate political humor because I like making fun of people. 




Based on watching this video clip, how likely are you to:  
(1 = not very likely, 4 = neutral, 7 = very likely) 
 
Watch clips like the one you saw.  
 
Recommend this video to a friend 
 
Forward a clip from this show 
 
Post a clip of this show on Facebook 
 
Post a comment to the shows website 
 
Watch other episodes of this show online 
 
Post a comment about this show on Twitter 
 
Watch others news programs like CNN 
 
Read other news content online 
 
Engage in a discussion about the topics on the show 
 











Other   ___________________________ 
 
Your Gender______   
 
Your Age_____ 
 
 
 
 
